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The Power of Distant Rewards: Driving 
International Innovation Through 
United States Patent Incentives 
Richard S. Gruner* 
Technological innovation outside the United States is increas-
ing. The United States remains the largest single source of new 
inventions, but the rest of the world produces most technological 
advances. Yet, even as innovation capacity outside the United 
States grows, the production of advances remains under-
incentivized in many developed and developing countries. Weak 
incentives apply to the outlier advances that are the province of 
patent laws. These outlier advances—typically reflecting material 
departures from prior technical knowledge and potentially estab-
lishing fundamentally new lines of technological development and 
consumer products—are particularly important components of 
technological development. By shortchanging incentives for outlier 
advances, society hinders the pace and scope of technological ad-
vancement. 
Talented innovators located outside the United States too often 
look to home country patent laws for invention rewards and incen-
tives. This results in weak incentives and undesirably low levels of 
technological innovation regarding the types of outlier advances 
addressed by patents. This article explains the inadequacy of many 
 
* Richard S. Gruner is the former Director of the Center for Intellectual Property at the 
John Marshall Law School in Chicago. Professor Gruner is a member of the New York 
and California state bars and a graduate of the University of California, Irvine (PhD, 
Criminology, Law and Society 2008), Columbia University School of Law (LL.M. 1982), 
USC School of Law (J.D. 1978), and California Institute of Technology (Caltech) (B.S. 
1975). He is the co-author (with Shubha Ghosh and Jay Kesan) of TRANSACTIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FROM STARTUPS TO PUBLIC COMPANIES (Carolina Acad. Press 
4th ed. 2018) and INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRIVATE RIGHTS, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, AND 
THE REGULATION OF CREATIVE ACTIVITY (West Acad. Pub. 3d ed. 2016). 
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home country patent laws to incentivize innovation by inventors 
working outside the United States. It argues that inventors across 
the world should look to United States patent laws for their prima-
ry invention rewards. Such a strategy will not only spur additional 
funding and institutional backing for research worldwide, but will 
increase the likelihood that more outlier technologies will be cre-
ated to the benefit of parties in the United States and throughout 
the world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
United States patent laws and associated rewards have the po-
tential to incentivize innovation not just in this country but around 
the world. Innovators presently produce technological advances in 
diverse countries.1 Yet, the patent incentives in innovators’ home 
countries may only provide weak incentives to produce socially 
valuable innovations. Local laws may be poorly understood or fail 
to apply to important categories of advances (such as inventions 
turning on computer programming).2 Even patent laws that are su-
perficially strong on their face (in that they are comprehensive and 
well-understood) may provide weak rewards due to poor enforce-
ment.3 And, even where strongly enforced, patent laws applying 
only to relatively small economies may produce small economic 
rewards, since patent rights to control the manufacture, use, and 
sale of patented items in those small economies will be sources of 
only minimal payments and rewards.4 
Fortunately, United States patent laws and the United States’ 
enormous economy can incentivize (and potentially subsidize) in-
novation across the world. Rewards from United States patent laws 
 
1 International patterns of research are discussed infra Section II. 
2 For an overview of the significant differences in patent protections for computer-
based advances across countries, see Ania Jedrusik and Phil Wadsworth, Patent 
Protection for Software-Implemented Inventions, WIPO (Feb. 2017), 
www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2017/01/article_0002.html [https://perma.cc/Q32S-
5C7Y].  
3 Differences in patent law enforcement across countries are discussed infra Section 
II.C.  
4 The impacts of local economy size on patent-influenced incentives for innovation 
are discussed infra Section II.A. 
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can substitute for the weak incentives that would prevail if only 
home country laws applied. Under United States laws, inventors 
working in most foreign countries are treated equally to inventors 
in the United States, meaning that innovators in even the smallest 
countries can look to patent-influenced rewards in the United 
States for innovation incentives and compensation for successful 
innovation efforts.5 The size of these patent-influenced rewards in 
the United States economy can, if properly pursued and managed, 
provide the primary inducements to innovation across the world 
and drive international innovation. 
In effect, the United States invites and pays for useful innova-
tions from worldwide sources. This “foreign aid” through the pa-
tent system does not require government intervention; rather, it oc-
curs through private commercial processes, as mediated by United 
States patent rights. 
This article describes why innovators throughout the world—
and particularly in developing countries—should look to United 
States patents as their primary source of incentives and compensa-
tion. With an appropriate patenting strategy in the United States, 
innovators in the smallest countries can operate on the same plane 
as their counterparts in the United States. Fund raising and innova-
tion planning that count on this source of rewards may promote 
innovation efforts in foreign settings far beyond the capabilities of 
local resources to justify and support technological research. 
This article emphasizes the features of United States patent 
laws (relative to patent laws in many foreign countries) that should 
make United States patent laws and technological needs among the 
first considerations for foreign innovators in targeting innovation 
efforts and in allocating resources to those efforts. The article goes 
on to consider some of the strengths and weaknesses of such an 
innovation strategy. Overall, the use of United States patent laws 
and rewards to drive innovation in accordance with the methods 
described here can both generate more innovations worldwide and 
 
5 The means by which to implement this patenting strategy and increase innovation 
incentives in both large and small countries are discussed infra Section III. 
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support profitable innovation efforts in diverse international set-
tings.6 
I. INDICATORS OF ROBUST INNOVATION CAPACITY OUTSIDE THE 
UNITED STATES 
A number of international indicators of innovation activities 
and related resources confirm that robust technological develop-
ment processes are at work outside the United States. As described 
in this section, foreign innovation is benefitting from growing re-
search and development (R&D) spending and increasing science 
and engineering expertise. This subsection reviews evidence of the 
strength and continuing growth in current technological innovation 
capacity outside the United States. 
A. International R&D Expenditures 
R&D spending is a global force supporting technological inno-
vation.7 Only a relatively small fraction of recent R&D spending 
worldwide occurred in the United States. While R&D spending in 
this country (approximately 26% of the global total of $1.918 tril-
lion in 2015) leads the world, the remaining 74% of R&D spending 
supports innovation in diverse other countries.8 According to the 
National Science Board, the top fifteen countries in R&D spending 
are9: 
 
 
 
 
6 Profiles of research efforts in several countries that appear to already benefit from 
subsidies based on United States patents are contained infra Section IV(C). 
7 See generally NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 
(2018), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/assets/nsb20181.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UG8W-45XE]. All of the R&D spending amounts included here reflect 
estimates in current purchasing power parity (PPP) United States dollars. The gross 
domestic product (GDP) figures used to compute the R&D spending to GDP ratios were 
also measured in PPP United States dollars. See id. at ch. 4, at 35–37, tbl.4–5. 
8 Id. at ch. 4, at 34–41. 
9 Id. at ch. 4, at 37–40, tbl.4–5. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
While R&D spending obviously varies greatly across the coun-
tries shown, at least three R&D spending patterns seem clear. First, 
a middle range of primary innovation producers spend remarkably 
similar amounts on R&D, taking into account differences in coun-
try economies. This similarity is apparent from the values above 
for R&D spending as a percent of country GDP. Focusing on the 
percentage values in Figure 1 and taking the United States as a 
“typical” benchmark for R&D spending at 2.74% of GDP, coun-
tries as dissimilar in location and background as Taiwan (3.05), 
Germany (2.93), France (2.22), Australia (2.11), and China (2.07) 
support roughly similar levels of R&D spending to the United 
Top Countries R&D Spending 2015
Country
Amount 
(Billion $)
Percent 
of Total
Percent 
of GDP
United States 497 26% 2.74
China 409 21% 2.07
Japan 170 9% 3.29
Germany 115 6% 2.93
South Korea 74 4% 4.23
France 61 3% 2.22
India 50 3% 0.63
United Kingdom 46 2% 1.7
Brazil 38 2% 1.17
Russia 38 2% 1.1
Taiwan 34 2% 3.05
Italy 30 2% 1.33
Canada 27 1% 1.71
Australia 23 1% 2.11
Spain 20 1% 1.22
Total Top 15 1631 85% NA
All Others 287 15% NA
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States. The differences in the absolute amounts of R&D spending 
across these countries may be artifacts reflecting the very large dif-
ferences in their economy sizes. 
However, two high and low variations from these countries’ 
spending patterns are also apparent. Taking into account their 
economy sizes, a few countries have markedly high R&D spend-
ing. Focusing once again on the percentage of GDP figures, South 
Korea (4.23) and Japan (3.29) spend more on R&D than the United 
States, adjusting for the sizes of their economies. The levels of re-
search spending in these countries is higher than their GDP size 
would suggest, using the experience of the United States as a pre-
dictor. Businesses and other parties in these countries apparently 
emphasized R&D projects over other commercial enterprises to a 
greater degree than in the United States. Researchers in these coun-
tries may also be relying on significant sources of research support 
from outside of their own economies that are not constrained by 
their own economy sizes. These countries may be early pioneers in 
the type of international subsidization of home country innovation 
advocated in this article and explained in more detail in the last 
section of this text.10 
Finally, several of the top fifteen R&D spenders seem to lag 
behind spending levels found in the United States and the compa-
rable countries mentioned above. In particular, adjusting for differ-
ences in their respective economy sizes, the percentage of GDP 
figures shown in Figure 1 indicate that India (0.63), Russia (1.1), 
Brazil (1.17), Spain (1.22), Italy (1.33), the United Kingdom (1.7), 
and Canada (1.71) have markedly lower R&D spending levels than 
the United States. This means that businesses and innovation 
sources in these countries appear to be underemphasizing R&D, at 
least in comparison to their counterparts in the United States. 
Businesses and other innovation sources, such as major universi-
ties, in these countries may be the primary beneficiaries of changes 
to embrace the innovation subsidization strategies advocated here, 
using the additional subsidies from this strategy to bring their R&D 
spending to the level of the United States and beyond. 
 
10 For a discussion of this strategy and the track records of a few countries that appear 
to be implementing it, see infra Section IV. 
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The patterns of R&D spending reflected in Figure 1 appear to 
be changing significantly in a few countries. China and South Ko-
rea are spending growing amounts on R&D, as spending in other 
countries stays relatively stable. This combination of selective 
growth and general stability is reflected in the following figure 
tracking changes in R&D spending over time11: 
FIGURE 2 
CHANGES IN R&D SPENDING: 1981 – 2015 
 
 
11 Originally published in NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 4 at 42, fig.4–
6. 
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Two features of the R&D spending changes in this figure stand 
out. First, in contrast to relatively similar levels of R&D spending 
from 1981 to 1995 (as measured from R&D spending as a percent-
age of GDP), after 1995 several countries diverged in their R&D 
spending. Japan moved to substantially higher R&D spending, 
while the United States and Germany increased spending modest-
ly. R&D spending in France remained about the same, and similar 
spending in the United Kingdom decreased. The result is growing 
gaps between the spending levels of these countries. 
More strikingly, R&D spending in China and South Korea has 
increased substantially since about 1998. In 1998, South Korean 
R&D spending corresponded to 2.16% of GDP (roughly equal to 
the level of the United States for 1998 of 2.49), but shot up to 
4.23% of GDP by 2015. This reflects nearly doubling of R&D 
spending by South Korea, as measured in relation to its GDP. 
The changes in Chinese R&D spending are even more im-
portant given the enormous size of that country’s economy and 
GDP. From 1998, when R&D spending was only .65% of China’s 
GDP, to 2015, when spending amounted to 2.07% of its GDP, 
spending on R&D in China rose to match the average for the Euro-
pean Union as a whole (1.96). This reflects a more than threefold 
increase in Chinese R&D spending over 1998 levels. Assuming 
United States R&D spending stays at about 2015 levels over time 
(2.74)12 and Chinese spending continues to grow at the same rate 
as it increased between 1998 and 2015, Chinese R&D spending 
will exceed that of the United States in about 2019.13 
B. International PhD Recipients in Science and Engineering 
Fields 
The worldwide distribution of scientific and engineering exper-
tise provides another perspective for estimating international inno-
 
12 As shown in Figure 2 above, this spending level has not changed greatly since 2009 
when it was 2.80.  
13 The gap between United States and Chinese spending levels in 2015 on a percentage 
of GDP basis was 2.74 - 2.07 = .67. The per year change in Chinese spending levels over 
the 17 years between 1998 and 2015 was approximately .187 per year. At this same rate 
of change, it will take about 3.6 years for Chinese spending to catch up with that of the 
United States. See supra Figure 2. 
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vation capacity. The home countries of recent doctoral degree re-
cipients in science and engineering fields are settings where the 
latest technical expertise will be available. Distributions of doctor-
al degree recipients help us predict the locations of the next wave 
of technology pioneers.14 The following figure summarizes the 
global distribution of new PhD graduates in science and engineer-
ing fields in 2014 (the countries are listed in descending order of 
their R&D spending, as reflected in Figure 1)15: 
FIGURE 3 
 
14 See. e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INDICATORS 10 
(2016) (using doctoral degree counts as key indicators of technology resources in 
particular countries and noting that “doctorate recipients add to the most highly trained 
segment of the international [science and engineering] workforce”), 
https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/uploads/1/1/overview.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5HFC-MT2F]. 
15 The earned doctorate counts in this figure are extracted from NATIONAL SCIENCE 
BOARD, supra note 7, at app. tbl.2–38, 2–39 (last visited Aug. 31, 2018). 
Top Countries S&E PhD Graduates 2014
PhDs Percent
Country (1000s) of PhDs
United States 40 17%
China 34 15%
Japan 7 3%
Germany 15 6%
South Korea 6 3%
France 10 4%
India 13 6%
United Kingdom 14 6%
Brazil 9 4%
Russia (2013) 19 8%
Taiwan 2 1%
Italy 6 3%
Canada 5 2%
Australia 5 2%
Spain 7 3%
Total Top 15 193 84%
Total All Sources 230 100%
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While these doctoral degree counts suggest that highly trained 
United States innovators will probably constitute the single largest 
national group pursuing future technological advances, much of 
the new expertise in science and engineering is likely to be located 
outside the United States. PhD recipients from the United States 
only constituted about 17% of the recent totals. While the home 
countries of doctoral degree recipients may not completely match 
the countries where the recipients will work (for example, a Ger-
man degree recipient may relocate to and complete research in the 
United States), the home countries of these degree recipients pro-
vide a rough measure of the new expertise flowing into various 
countries.16 
Using this measure, future technology development by foreign 
PhD recipients may produce about 83% of all advances (corre-
sponding to the percentage of PhD recipients in science and engi-
neering fields from countries other than the United States). As with 
R&D spending, the worldwide distribution of state-of-the-art sci-
ence and engineering expertise (as reflected in the location of re-
cent PhD recipients) suggests that much of the future of technology 
development lies outside the United States. 
C. Science and Engineering Article Production 
Scientific and engineering academic publications provide fur-
ther evidence of probable foreign sources of technology innova-
tion. Large numbers of published academic articles tend to corre-
late with intensive academic research activities and substantial in-
novation capabilities.17 Institutions where academic research con-
cerning science and engineering is flourishing are settings where 
related technology innovation is likely.18 While not all academic 
findings described in published scientific and engineering articles 
will translate into new technology designs, such findings are often 
 
16 See. e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 14, at 10 . 
17 See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 92 (last visited Aug. 29, 
2018) (“The output volume of research, article counts, is one basic indicator of the degree 
to which different performers contribute to the world’s production of research-based 
[science and engineering] knowledge.”). 
18 See id. 
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the jumping off point for new products and services. The academ-
ics who have made the findings may be the best positioned to pur-
sue or at least aid related technology development. Furthermore, 
the presence of an actively publishing academic community in a 
given country implies that many highly trained parties emerging 
from the same academic community are probably available for 
technology development in that country. 
The following figure summarizes recent international trends in 
sources of academic publications19: 
FIGURE 4 
Science and Engineering Articles: 2006 – 2016 
 
19 Originally published in id. at ch. 5–110, Figure 5–22. The article percentages 
reflected in this figure are derived from article counts. Id. at ch. 5–127, app. tbl.5–27. For 
a more detailed breakdown of article counts by country, see id. at ch. 5–112, Table ch. 5–
23.  
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As this figure illustrates, the United States was the largest sin-
gle source of published academic articles, but was recently 
eclipsed in this respect by China in 2016.20 Authors in the United 
States accounted for only 17.8% of the published articles in 2016.21 
Of the 82.2% produced outside the United States, the top sources 
were China (18.6%), India (4.8%), and Japan (4.2%).22 Countries 
in the European Union collectively accounted for a substantial 
share of all articles in 2016 (26.7%).23 However, large shares were 
also produced by other developed countries (11.4%) and develop-
ing countries (16.3%).24 
The large fraction of published science and engineering articles 
emerging from outside of the United States—and particularly the 
substantial fraction from developing countries—indicate that in the 
future, technological advances will probably come from diverse 
sources around the world. Some sources like India, which provide 
large numbers of published scientific and engineering works, but 
are relatively low in R&D spending, as measured by spending to 
GDP ratios,25 appear to have substantial scientific and engineering 
talent on hand. The same may be true for developing countries 
with substantial numbers of academic publications. Whether this 
talent can be translated into comparable high levels of technology 
 
20 See Jeff Tollefson, China Declared World’s Largest Producer of Scientific Articles, 
NATURE (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-00927-
4?utm_source=twt_nnc&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=naturenews&sf17957768
4=1 [https://perma.cc/ST5H-Z9JV]. 
21 See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 110, Figure 5–22. 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
24 See id. 
25 Using R&D spending to GDP ratios as measures of R&D spending treats different 
counties as if they had the same size economies (that is, the same GDPs) potentially 
supporting R&D spending. Differences in these ratios reflect differences in R&D 
spending that are not merely reflections of differences in economy sizes across countries. 
Thus, for example, the R&D spending ratios in Figure 1 indicate that France (R&D 
spending to GDP ratio of 2.22) and Australia (R&D spending to GDP ratio of 2.11) 
devote approximately the same fractions of their economy to R&D spending even though 
the French economy (with a GDP of about $ 61 billion) is almost three times the size of 
the Australian economy (with a GDP of about $23 billion). See NATIONAL SCIENCE 
BOARD, supra note 7. 
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innovation may depend more on increased R&D spending than on 
the cultivation of new scientific and engineering expertise.26 The 
publishing track record of these countries suggests that substantial 
expertise is present but needs to be matched by R&D spending 
support.27 The type of patent-influenced research funding and de-
velopment described in this article may be a means for these coun-
tries to build on their high expertise and academic publishing lev-
els through increased R&D spending. 
D. Implications of Recent Dominance of Foreign Innovation 
The evidence of the strength of foreign innovation presented to 
this point provides a remarkably consistent prediction of foreign 
domination in future technological development.28 Whether esti-
mated from R&D spending (with a United States percentage of 
26% of worldwide totals in 2015), PhD recipients (United States 
percentage of about 17% in 2014), or academic article production 
(United States percentage of about 18% in 2016), the United States 
seems likely to account for no more than about a quarter of future 
research efforts and supporting resources worldwide.29 The re-
maining three quarters or more of innovation will therefore be 
spread across the globe. 
Given the magnitude of potential overseas innovation, what are 
the incentives promoting overseas innovation? As detailed in the 
 
26 The presence of raw scientific and engineering talent—as evidenced by large 
academic communities generating large numbers of academic articles—suggests the 
potential ability of talented individuals to solve technical problems and to formulate new 
technical designs. However, R&D funding is needed to support design projects 
undertaken by these talented individuals and to translate their expertise into workable 
technology designs. Furthermore, even if new technical designs produce some functional 
results, further R&D spending may be needed to transform basic designs into popular 
products used by numerous consumers. Thus, while extensive technical expertise is 
necessary to support technology development, the addition of substantial R&D spending 
to apply the expertise is also needed to produce successful new technologies with wide 
acceptance and importance to technology users and technology suppliers. See Tendayi 
Viki, Why R&D Spending Is Not a Measure Of Innovation, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2016, 1:46 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tendayiviki/2016/08/21/why-rd-spending-is-not-a-
measure-of-innovation/#7dc3407dc77d [https://perma.cc/2P48-LSFZ]. 
27 See id. 
28 See infra Sections II.A– II.C. 
29 See infra Sections II.A– II.C. 
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next two sections of this article, there are reasons to believe that 
patent-influenced incentives for overseas innovation are surprising-
ly weak.30 
Weak patent incentives for overseas innovation are particularly 
important since they hinder production of fundamentally new out-
lier innovations.31 Outlier advances reflecting marked departures 
from past technology understanding play key roles in technology 
development. These advances have the potential to produce fun-
damentally new products and services based on the latest scientific 
knowledge. Furthermore, outlier advances have the potential to 
divert subsequent technology developments in new directions that 
innovators might not otherwise have pursued, enriching the tech-
nology base or “prior art” from which further innovations can 
spring. Outlier advances—roughly the same as the nonobvious ad-
vances promoted by the United States patent system32—are the fo-
cus of patent systems in most countries.33 These outlier advances 
are referred to here for convenience as “patentable advances” or 
“patentable technologies.” 
 
30 Patent laws in many foreign countries offer limited incentives due to both the small 
size of many foreign economies and the at times weak enforcement of patent laws. See 
infra Section III. While patent rights and incentives under United States laws are 
available to foreign inventors, the force of United States markets and patent-influenced 
rewards under United States laws are not being fully applied to promote advances from 
outside the United States. See infra Section IV. 
31 Weak patent incentives undercut the normal impacts of patent systems in promoting 
the creation of outlier advances. Patent-influenced rewards encourage highly talented 
innovators to take risks on innovation projects that prevailing technical knowledge 
suggests are likely to fail. The promotion of more high-risk projects by talented 
innovators tends to increase the number of outlier advances produced. Absent patent 
incentives, highly talented innovators will tend to apply more of their efforts to lower risk 
endeavors with greater likelihood of success and returns. See Richard S. Gruner, 
Imagination, Invention, and Patent Incentives: The Psychology of Patent Law, U. ILL. J. 
L. TECH. & POL’Y. 375 (2017). 
32 Patents and associated innovation incentives are limited under United States patent 
laws to advances that would not be obvious to a well-informed person of average skill in 
the field of the advance. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); Graham v. John Deere Co. of 
Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). 
33 For a discussion of the similarities between United States standards for non-
obviousness and foreign patent requirements requiring advances to involve an “inventive 
step” or other equivalent features, see John Barton, Non-Obviousness, 43 IDEA: THE J. 
OF L. & TECH. 475, 475–506 (2003). 
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Weak incentives apply to patentable technology innovation un-
dertaken outside the United States for two reasons: 1) the weakness 
of the patent rewards and incentives in many of the foreign coun-
tries where inventors work, making reliance on home country pa-
tent laws a source of only small innovation incentives (for reasons 
described more fully in the section III of this article) and 2) the 
failure of many foreign inventors to look to patent rewards in the 
United States and in other countries with large economies as 
sources of major research rewards and incentives for outlier inno-
vations (discussed in section IV of this article). 
II. POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES IN HOME COUNTRY PATENT 
INCENTIVES 
There are several reasons why many innovators may find that 
patent laws in their home countries are sources of poor incentives 
and potential distractions for innovation projects aimed at patenta-
ble advances. This follows from several features of the patent laws 
and economies of specific countries, as described in this subsec-
tion. 
Unfortunately, some observers have suggested that strong 
home country intellectual property laws are essential for promoting 
local innovation and that important support for technology devel-
opment can be produced through relatively simple legal changes in 
home country laws.34 The view that improved patent laws and en-
forcement in developing countries will incentivize innovation in 
those countries is often expressed, but largely inaccurate. Com-
mentators have claimed that, if only patent laws were strengthened 
and regularly enforced in developing country “X,” technological 
research and development in that country would be encouraged 
and likely to increase materially.35 
 
34 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Roundtable: Enforcement, A Priority for All Countries 
in FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 64 (2006), http://photos.state.gov
/libraries/korea/49271/dwoa_122709/Focus-On-Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X7TL-K3G9].  
35 See id. This view was captured in the following comments by Joseph Howard, a 
senior attorney adviser in the Intellectual Property Rights Branch of the U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection Service:  
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This view is misleading in at least five respects: 1) even with 
strong patent laws, small home country economies will only yield 
small innovation rewards; 2) substantive uncertainties about patent 
laws and related rights can undercut the value of such rights; 3) 
weak enforcement of home country patent rights may further re-
duce projected patent rewards; 4) local commercial interests in 
some developing countries may ensure weak patent enforcement; 
and 5) consumer interests may support weak patent enforcement in 
some countries. These sources of weak patent rewards in specific 
countries are detailed in this subsection. 
A. Small Markets Produce Small Rewards at Best 
Even where a country has strongly drafted and comprehensive-
ly enforced patent laws, if the economy in that country is small, the 
scope of patent-influenced revenues and rewards from local patent 
enforcement will also tend to be small. The amount of the rewards 
is constrained by the size of the local economy. The patent incen-
tives to an innovator in that country from home country patent en-
forcement will be similarly constrained. 
Most patent-mediated rewards for patented advances result 
from elevated prices that patent holder, or their licensees, can 
charge for goods or services incorporating the patented features.36 
 
Perhaps the most critical obstacle to effective enforcement is the 
absence of a full understanding of the value of intellectual property 
rights to every nation that engages in international trade. 
I’ve spoken in several countries overseas, and in each I was asked, 
‘Why should we do this? Why are we protecting the wealthy nations 
or manufacturers who own these intellectual property rights?’ 
My response is that, first, if your country is governed by the rule of 
law and has signed certain international agreements, it is obligated to 
adhere to its agreements. Secondly, as your country develops its own 
sectors in which manufacturers, inventors, or artisans are creating 
intellectual property, it’s important that you give them the full value 
of their rights. Id.  
36 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994) (Patent rights typically give a patent holder exclusive 
control over the use, making, selling, and importation of a patented advance. Patent 
holders can use these rights to force consumers to pay elevated prices for patented goods 
or services, subject to the limit that consumers will not pay more for patented items over 
unpatented substitutes performing the same function than the incremental utility of the 
patented items will justify (e.g., if a patented item provides 20% more functionality that 
an earlier unpatented item, it is unlikely that consumers will pay more than 20% more for 
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The maximum amount that a patent holder can hope to gain for 
sales of a patented produce in a given country is the aggregate 
amount that consumers will pay for items with the patented feature 
over products without the feature.37 Where there are either few 
consumers who will pay elevated prices for a patented item or the 
amount each will pay is small, the aggregate rewards for a patented 
advance will also be small. Consequently, small populations or 
small economies usually produce small patent rewards. 
These rewards will be dwarfed by the comparable patent-
influenced revenues available in the United States. This is simply a 
consequence of the relative size of the economies involved. Sales 
charges, or equivalent charges for use of patented advances, pro-
duce patent-mediated rewards for patented inventions. Smaller 
sales volumes, as would occur in a developing economy as op-
posed to in the United States, produce smaller rewards. 
 
the patented version). Patent rights controlling the use, making and importation of 
patented items are generally used as compliments to rights to control the sale of the 
items; these rights are exercised to ensure that patented items are only obtained through 
supply chains authorized by a patent holder and in which the patent holder gains either an 
elevated sale price or an equivalent licensing royalty.).  
37 This maximum profit estimate assumes that the patent holder captures all the 
increased market value of the patented item over non-patented substitutes. In real 
commercial processes, this value will probably be split among consumers, product 
suppliers, retail outlets, and the patent holder. Thus, if a patented advance works 20% 
better than its unpatented counterpart, it might be priced at an amount 15% above that for 
its non-patented counterparts. Of this 15% increment, the patent holder might receive a 
patent licensing royalty of 5%, while the product manufacturer and the retailer that sold 
the item might retain about 5% of the heightened sales price each. The latter two 
percentages give these parties incentives to shift emphasis in their respective activities to 
the patented item rather than its unpatented predecessor. The difference between the 
amount paid and the increased utility received by the consumer (20% - 15% = 5%) is net 
benefit retained by the consumer, giving this party an incentive to shift from use of the 
older unpatented item to a new patented version with new benefits but also new use 
uncertainties. These benefit-sharing numbers, while hypothetical, are illustrative of how 
the full utility of a patented advance may not produce profits in the hands of a patent 
holder, but instead produce profits that will be shared by all parties in the supply chain, 
including consumers, who have a stake in the new utility. 
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B. Substantive Legal Uncertainties May Muddy Patent 
Enforcement and Weaken Incentives 
Relatively recently drafted and occasionally enforced patent 
laws in foreign countries may also create weak innovation incen-
tives due to substantive uncertainties in patent laws or uncertain 
perceptions of such laws.38 Strong patent incentives require that 
potential innovators have knowledge of the criteria for patent issu-
ance and confidence that the likelihood of patent-influenced re-
wards will be enhanced if the patenting criteria are met.39 Where 
patent laws are uncertain, the size of patent rewards and incentives 
are correspondingly discounted and have a reduced impact in en-
couraging innovation.40 In a parallel fashion, uncertain patent in-
centives undercut research funding and invention marketing ef-
forts. Parties who fear that their research funding may provide 
profits for other concerns are likely to place their funding else-
where and avoid the threats of free riders. Likewise, persons con-
sidering developing new products and marketing campaigns based 
on patented advances are less likely to do so if they feel that their 
product perfection or marketing outlays will result in profits for 
others because patent-influenced exclusivity of the resulting prod-
ucts and market demand cannot be maintained. 
 
38 Previous researchers have noted that uncertainty in legal penalties can undercut the 
deterrent effect of the penalties by causing those threatened to discount the size of the 
penalties by the amounts of the relevant uncertainties. Where it is highly uncertain that 
large penalties will be imposed, the deterrent impact of the penalties is decreased 
accordingly. Uncertain legal standards therefore undercut the deterrent function of the 
penalties imposed under the standards. See, e.g., Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, 
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. OF LAW, ECON. & ORG. 279 (1986). The 
same is true in reverse for the incentives created by patent laws. Uncertain rewards create 
weaker incentives than rewards of the same value that are more certain to be gained. 
Uncertainty about whether patent laws apply (and whether associated patent-mediated 
rewards will be gained) undercuts the incentive function of the uncertain laws over 
similar laws that are either clearer or more consistently enforced. 
39 See id. 
40 See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Uncertain Patent Rights and a Weakening U.S. Innovation 
Economy, LANDSLIDE 40, 42 (Sept./Oct. 2018) (“[L]egal uncertainty [regarding patent 
rights] undermines decisions to invest in and create the new inventions and innovative 
commercial arrangements that lead to new products and services in the innovation 
economy.”); see also Blog Comment, IP WATCHDOG (Aug. 14, 2018) (“[A] sure way to 
make U.S. patents all the more weaker  . . .  is to make/allow/perpetuate law almost no 
one can decipher [and] effectively rely on.”). 
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C. Weak Enforcement May Further Undercut Patent Value 
In many developing countries, patent laws on the books are 
poorly enforced.41 The promise of patent rewards through home 
country patent enforcement in these countries must be further re-
duced to reflect lost rewards corresponding to unremedied patent 
infringement. The projected net revenues perceived by an inventor 
in Country X following the patenting and commercial development 
of his or her invention in that country will be discounted by the 
chances that the invention involved will simply be copied without 
compensation due to poor patent enforcement, causing the inventor 
involved to realize little or nothing from patent enforcement. 
In some countries, patent enforcement maybe be very weak—
at least relative to United States levels. Systematic assessments of 
foreign intellectual property (IP) systems and the value of IP rights 
in these systems have revealed significant weaknesses and reasons 
to doubt the value of rights there. For example, after scrutinizing 
foreign enforcement of intellectual property (IP) laws across nu-
merous countries, the Global Intellectual Property Center of the 
United States Chamber of Commerce rated the effectiveness of 
many countries’ IP rights enforcement substantially below United 
States levels.42 Rights enforcement ratings for many countries were 
half or less of comparable ratings for the United States. Low rat-
ings were applied to several countries with large economies, such 
as Brazil (47% of the United States rating), China (38%), Russia 
(37%), and India (22%).43 Several countries received even lower 
IP enforcement ratings.44 In countries with weak IP rights en-
forcement, receipt of substantial patent-influenced rewards based 
on local laws may be an illusion for home country inventors.45 
 
41 See M. PUGATCH, D. TORSTENNSSON & R. CHU, CREATE U.S. CHAMBER 
INTERNATIONAL IP INDEX (6th ed. 2018) http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/GIPC_IP_Index_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/X76Z-4WTJ].  
42 See id. 
43 Id. at 48. 
44 The lowest reported level was that for Venezuela at only 9% of the United States 
rating. Id. 
45 Home country and foreign patent holders may fare equally poorly in IP litigation in 
some of these countries. For example, recent research concerning the enforcement of 
patent rights by Chinese and foreign holders of patents in China has shown that these two 
groups achieved comparable success rates, undercutting concerns about discrimination in 
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This contrasts with the generally strong enforcement of civil 
legal claims in the United States, including claims for patent in-
fringement, and the potential in the United States for either large 
patent-induced royalties through the threat of rights enforcement46 
or substantial patent infringement damage recoveries. Beyond the 
heightened patent value resulting from its far larger economy, the 
United States provides a stronger patent enforcement environment 
than many countries.47 The United States offers patent holders a 
mature patent ecosystem, including a sophisticated patent prosecu-
tion bar and experienced patent litigators, a frequently tested body 
of patent law clarified in many details through extensive case hold-
 
Chinese courts against foreign patent holders. See Renjun Bian, How Foreign Patentees 
Fared in Patent Litigation in China, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 6, 2018), https://patentlyo.com
/patent/2018/02/things-infringement-litigation.html [https://perma.cc/XR5X-8TQD]. 
However, the evaluation in this study of all patent infringement judgements reached by 
Chinese courts in 2014 suggests that few patent holders are receiving relief there for 
patent infringement. The study found only 1663 findings of patent infringement in 
Chinese courts during 2014 (taking into account judgments for both Chinese and foreign 
patent holders). This compares with over 1,302,687 Chinese patents issued in 2014. 
While the judgements rendered in 2014 are not a direct match to the patents issued in the 
same year—indeed, the judgments presumably reflected Chinese patents issued in many 
years—the ratio between numbers of patent interests outstanding and numbers of 
successful enforcement efforts is striking. The successful patent infringement findings in 
Chinese courts were only 1,663 / 1,302,687 = .0013 or .13% of the rate of patent issuance 
in 2014. This suggests that the vast majority of Chinese patent holders may not be 
receiving successful patent enforcement relief, at least through Chinese judicial 
processes. See id.  
46 The value of a patent in supporting patent licensing and related royalty returns 
depends directly on the threatened force and value of a patent in litigation. “A patent 
without enforcement value has no licensing value.” Gene Quinn, A Patent Without 
Enforcement Value Has No Licensing Value, IP WATCHDOG (Sept. 21, 2017), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/09/21/patent-without-enforcement-value-
licensing/id=88089/ [https://perma.cc/U685-9NW6].  
47 In an evaluation by the Global Innovation Policy Center of intellectual property 
rights enforcement within the legal systems of several countries, enforcement within the 
United States received the highest rating. See Global Innovation Policy Center, supra 
note 41, at 48. The strengths noted in the United States’ IP enforcement system included: 
1) support for key IP rights, including sector-specific rights, 2) a largely supportive 
technology transfer and commercialization environment in the United States (despite 
some weakness due to uncertainty in systems essential patent (SEP) licensing, 3) a 
generally deterrent IP enforcement framework, 4) active inter-governmental coordination 
regarding IP issues, and 5) government public awareness raising and engagement on IP. 
See id. at 156. 
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ings,48 and a powerful, sanction-backed system for enforcing civil 
damage recoveries and injunctive relief. Further enforcement 
mechanisms, such as the efforts of the United States Border Patrol 
in monitoring and interdicting imports of infringing goods,49add to 
the substantiality of United States patent law enforcement. The re-
sult is that United States patent rights have real meaning in United 
States markets,50 resulting in corresponding value in royalties or 
patent-influenced prices.51 
D. Local Commercial Interests in Developing Countries May 
Favor Continued Weak Patent Enforcement 
Patent rewards in some developing countries may also be small 
because government officials support weak patent enforcement to 
serve local commercial interests. For a given developing country, 
stronger enforcement of patent laws may be a mixed blessing. If 
local parties see few if any net benefits from strong patent en-
forcement,52 the alternative of weak enforcement will be likely to 
 
48 Clarity in patent law, while a general virtue of the United States patent system, is not 
uniform across all technology areas. For example, in 2018 the United States Department 
of Commerce, while giving the United States intellectual property system its highest 
rating among intellectual property legal ecosystems around the world, pointed out that 
one notable weakness in the United States’ generally strong system was the 
“[u]ncertainty over patentability for high-tech sectors.” See Global Innovation Policy 
Center, supra note 41, at 156. 
49 See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights (Aug. 2012), https://www.cbp.gov/document/publications/cbp-enforcement-
intellectual-property-rights [https://perma.cc/S63Y-QZ8S]. 
50 In comparison with the counterpart features of other legal systems, the Global 
Innovation Policy Center gave the United States civil legal system the highest possible 
rating for the recognition of IP as an asset and for the quality of civil and procedural 
remedies for IP rights infringement. See PUGATCH ET AL., supra note 41, at 156.  
51 An estimate by the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Economics & 
Statistics Administration of the Department of Commerce placed the value added to the 
United States economy by patent-intensive industries at $763 in 2010 rising to $881 
billion in 2014. See Economics & Statistics Administration & U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office, Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: 2016 Update 22 (2016), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KD7H-XQSG].  
52 A number of technology development and access experts have argued that 
strengthening IP rights in developing countries imposes burdens on these countries that 
are not commensurate with the associated benefits. Walter G. Park and Douglas C. 
Lippoldt have summarized these criticisms as follows:  
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prevail, and patent rights in that country will provide few incen-
tives for innovation. 
Different parties within a developing country may see the merit 
of strong patent enforcement very differently. For innovators, 
strong patent enforcement will be desirable because it will provide 
at least some rewards for innovation (albeit perhaps modest re-
wards in countries with small economies). Additional parties may 
also have interests in strong patent protection. For parties seeking 
to expand manufacturing activities based on technologies drawn 
from other countries, the reassurance of strong patent controls in a 
country with manufacturing capabilities may encourage transfers 
into the countries of patent-protected technologies and encourage 
expanded manufacturing based on the new technologies. In a simi-
lar fashion, strong patent protection in a country may encourage 
increased investment in manufacturing operations based on im-
ported technologies, since patent protections will lessen investors 
risks in such manufacturing enterprises. However, for consumers 
of patent-protected products, strong patent enforcement may mean 
higher prices and lower access to desired items. The net benefit of 
increased patent enforcement in a particular country will depend 
on the combination of these positive and negative impacts. 
 
The accusation is that the emerging standards raise the cost of 
intellectual content in products sought by developing countries, while 
developing countries may not have the capacity to capitalise on their 
own potential in a similar manner. Moreover, [Carlos Maria] Correa 
alleges that the implicit bargain underlying the strengthening of the 
international IPR regime has not been satisfied. Some developing 
countries have argued in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) that promises of 
technology transfer as contained in the TRIPS Agreement  . . .  do not 
appear to be yielding corresponding benefits for developing 
countries, whereas the strengthened IPR may raise costs for 
developing countries seeking to upgrade their technological 
capabilities.  
Walter G. Park & Douglas C. Lippoldt, Technology Transfer and the Economic 
Implications of the Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing 
Countries, http://nw08.american.edu/~wgp/park_lippoldt08.pdf [https://perma.cc/47TB-
B6HV] (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (citing Carlos Maria Correa, How Intellectual 
Property Rights Can Obstruct Progress, SCIDEV.NET (April 4, 2005), 
https://www.scidev.net/global/r-d/opinion/how-intellectual-property-rights-can-obstruct-
prog.html [https://perma.cc/DU3K-45SV]). 
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Projecting the future advantages of strong patent enforcement 
in expanded innovation, manufacturing, or investment may be 
highly speculative (as with any complex projection of the future) 
and be far overshadowed by the current disadvantages of patent 
enforcement, namely higher prices and product restrictions. Disad-
vantages now will loom larger and be more persuasive than hoped 
for advantages later. Hence, policy makers may rationally choose 
to maintain poor patent enforcement in some countries. 
E. Consumer Interests May Dominate Political Processes and 
Preclude Support for Patent Enforcement and Higher Product 
Prices 
Weak patent enforcement may prevail in a particular country 
because it is the politically popular choice. Consumers of technical 
advances—that is, buyers of technology-enhanced products and 
services—may resist patent-influenced higher product prices even 
where commercial leaders and policy makers can see the long-term 
advantages of patent incentives and enhanced technology devel-
opment. Product users who benefit from weak enforcement and 
low cost product access unconstrained by patents may be much 
larger in number and political power than the advocates of strong 
patent enforcement.53 The benefits and burdens of patent enforce-
ment may fall on different parties depending on parties’ interests in 
technology development or product manufacturing (which would 
tend to make parties favor patent enforcement) versus product use 
or consumption (which would tend to make parties oppose patent 
enforcement to lower product prices and increase product access). 
It is possible that net support for strong patent enforcement in a 
given country may boil down to a power struggle between the por-
tions of a country’s population, or the power holders within that 
population, who are benefitted and burdened by strong patent en-
forcement. Strong patent enforcement will only prevail if the range 
of parties benefitting from patent-influenced prices for access to 
 
53 See generally Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent 
System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341 (2009). 
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patented products and services gain control over parties who object 
to paying patent-influenced prices.54 
The number of parties benefitted or burdened may have some 
influence over patent policies and the strength of patent rights en-
forcement. Where the benefits of patent enforcement fall on a nar-
row group (such as business owners able to marshal extensive re-
sources and engage in large scale manufacturing), the detriments of 
IP enforcement are spread across a larger number of parties (such 
as the numerous consumers adversely affected by consumer goods 
with prices increased through strong patent enforcement). The po-
litical clout of the adversely affected parties may trump the eco-
nomic clout of the benefitted parties. This may cause a country to 
accept the socially popular and administratively easy course of 
weak patent enforcement even though the country’s overall eco-
nomic interests would benefit more from stronger patent enforce-
ment. 
F. Adding Up the Cumulative Effects: Why Few Incentives Flow 
from Many Home Country Patent Laws 
The reasons described here for low innovation rewards availa-
ble through home country patent enforcement are cumulative. In a 
given country, they may all reduce the potential rewards and incen-
tives available to new technology developers who look solely to 
home country patent laws. Small economies will unavoidably cre-
ate small rewards which will be reduced further by doubts about 
patent enforcement. Looking to these doubtful rewards, potential 
innovators relying solely on home country incentives will often 
have little reason to pursue high risk innovation aimed at outlier 
 
54 This analysis is oversimplified in that it ignores the possibility that product 
consumers may see an interest in strong patent enforcement as a means to incentivize 
innovation and thereby increase the range and quality of products available to consumers. 
While these long-term benefits of patent enforcement may be real, they may be 
overshadowed in consumers’ minds by the short-term detriments of higher product prices 
due to patent enforcement. Such a cost-benefit analysis emphasizing short-term impacts 
will tend to cause consumers to oppose strong patent enforcement. Parties taking this 
position for their countries’ laws may be content to rely on United States patent laws and 
those of other countries with large economies to drive product innovation and produce 
new products which can then be introduced in the countries with weak patent 
enforcement. 
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advances markedly departing from prior, well-understood technical 
knowledge. These sorts of technically uncertain projects will simp-
ly seem unjustified given further uncertainty about whether suc-
cessful projects will gain patent-mediated rewards. 
In the face of both technical and legal uncertainties, research 
resources will tend to be diverted towards more predictably suc-
cessful enterprises, such as mundane product improvements 
through incremental changes made in accordance with current 
knowledge to produce predictably successful results.55 These obvi-
ous technology changes, while of some technical value, do not 
contribute to significant technology shifts and new branches of 
technical knowledge in the same ways as outlier advances involv-
ing patentable subject matter. 
Absent strong incentives for high risk projects departing from 
technical adjustments with predictable results, technological ad-
vances will stagnate around the standard designs and well under-
stood design principles.56 Patent incentives are designed to break 
 
55 Patent laws create specially targeted incentives to encourage innovators to go 
beyond mundane technology adjustments in accordance with widely available technical 
knowledge and to reach for advances that are not obvious to most parties in the field of 
the advances. The patent system encourages persons to both seek these sorts of non-
obvious advances and to disclose them to the public. This combination encourages a few 
especially skilled or unusually well-informed innovators to pursue advances that are 
beyond the capabilities of most parties in their fields. Beyond focusing these exceptional 
innovators on outlier advances, the patent system also encourages such innovators to 
disclose their unusual results, thereby ensuring that their rare advances are not lost to the 
public or used in secret but rather added to be body of technical knowledge to inform 
later technology development. See generally Richard S. Gruner, Why We Need a Strong 
Patent System and When: Filling the Void Left by the Bilski Case, 28 SANTA CLARA 
COMP. & HIGH TECH. L. J. 499 (2012). 
56 Simple alterations to technologies involving small changes and predictable results 
will tend to dominate technology development for several reasons. First, development of 
these sorts of designs will entail little risk to innovators as they will generally be able to 
predict the success of their new designs from the outset of developing the designs. The 
risk of project failure will be low and innovators will be able to produce “satisfactory” 
new designs with a high degree of certainty. Second, parties seeking to manufacture and 
commercialize products with new designs will also tend to minimize their risks if they 
deal with new designs that are modest changes to older products that have already been 
manufactured and marketed. Manufacturing and marketing of the new products will 
benefit from whatever was learned in producing and commercializing their similar 
predecessors. The risks of new product failure will again be minimized. Finally, parties 
seeking funding and other resources for technology development projects may find it 
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this pattern by creating special incentives for inventors to resist 
traveling the easy path of obvious adjustments to old designs by 
instead seeking significantly new design approaches not previously 
obvious to the bulk of technology specialists.57 These sorts of new 
outlier advances are the realm of patent incentives.58 Yet, in coun-
tries where local patent laws create few incentives for the reasons 
detailed here, the promotion of these highly important outlier ad-
vances may be very weak. 
Fortunately, innovators worldwide are not limited to home 
country patent incentives. They can look beyond their own coun-
tries’ patent laws and incentives to those in countries with large 
economies like the United States.59 Innovators in countries with 
small economies or poorly enforced patent laws should give home 
country patent rights secondary consideration, if any, and look for 
primary incentives and research support via aggressive use of pa-
tent rights in the United States.60 Overseas innovators producing 
 
easier to explain and justify major investments in projects advancing technologies along 
familiar and predictable lines than in interesting investors and other resource holders in 
backing projects with fundamentally new requirements and risks of failure. For all these 
reasons, projects involving low-risk changes to prior technology designs will often seem 
more meritorious and deserving of attention and support from innovators and their 
backers than the high risk projects aiming at unpredictable outlier advances. To overcome 
this natural bias against outlier projects and to increase their number, patent incentives 
provide extra incentives to parties who not only imagine outlier advances but who bring 
these advances to reality and translate them into commercial successes from which patent 
rewards can be gained. For a more detailed analysis of the need for patent incentives as 
means to overcome human limitations in imagining outlier advances beyond common 
technology understanding, see Richard S. Gruner, Imagination, Invention, and Patent 
Incentives: The Psychology of Patent Law, 2017 U. OF ILL. J. LAW, TECH. & POLICY 375 
(2017). 
57 See id. 
58 See 35 U.S.C. § 103; Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 13–17 (1966). 
59 While the analysis in this article focuses on foreign inventors’ reliance on innovation 
incentives derived from United States patent laws and related economic processes, 
parallel arguments can be raised encouraging inventors to also look to other strong 
economies—such as those within Europe—as sources of further innovation incentives to 
supplement those gained through reliance on United States patents and patent rewards. A 
strategy of relying on patent laws in further countries will be important in proportion to 
the size of the economies of the further countries and the strength, and certainty, of patent 
rights there. 
60 For simplicity, this article focuses on the advantages of patenting in the United 
States. However, many of the same factors favoring patenting in the United States by 
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new patentable technologies can serve as technology exporters and 
seek compensation for their efforts in the overseas potential for 
exports of their work. They can also seek financing and other sup-
port for their research based on this overseas potential for their re-
sults. But, they can only securely accomplish these intellectual 
property exports through reliance on United States patents. 
The key to these strategies—both leveraging the overseas po-
tential of outlier research before it is performed and reaping the 
overseas rewards for successful results—is reliance on the full pa-
tent rights available in the United States to foreign inventors. The 
basis for these rights available to foreign inventors—and the 
strength of the innovation incentives they create worldwide—are 
the subjects of the next section of this article. 
III. US PATENTS AS STRONG ALTERNATIVES FOR INCENTIVIZING 
FOREIGN INNOVATION 
A. Benefits of National Treatment Under United States Patent 
Laws 
Patent laws of the United States and of most industrialized 
countries provide for “national treatment” of inventors. National 
treatment means that foreign inventors are treated equally with in-
ventors who are citizens or “nationals” of the countries enacting 
the laws.61 Thus, for example, a party making an invention in 
Germany can apply for and gain patent rights regarding the inven-
tion in the United States in the same way and to the same extent as 
a United States citizen making the same invention in the United 
States. The German inventor will be treated in the same manner as 
a citizen of the United States in applying for and enforcing patent 
rights under United States laws. 
 
foreign innovators will also apply to patenting in other countries with large economies 
and will, accordingly, support patenting in these further countries. 
61 “Stated simply, national treatment requires each government to apply the same 
provisions to both its own citizens and foreign nationals.”  R. Carl Moy, The History of 
the Patent Harmonization Treaty: Economic Self-Interest as an Influence, 26 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 457, 484 (1993). 
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National treatment under patent laws and other intellectual 
property laws follows from international trade norms requiring 
equal treatment of foreign and domestic parties generally. Several 
treaties promoting international trade require signatory countries to 
provide for national treatment in laws governing sales of goods, 
the provision of services, and other trade features. This principle is 
reflected in fundamental international standards for commerce and 
trade, including all three of the major World Trade Organization 
(WTO) treaties: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT),62 the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),63 
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS).64 As summarized by the WTO, international 
treaty standards specify that: 
Imported and locally-produced goods should be treated equal-
ly—at least after the foreign goods have entered the market. The 
same should apply to foreign and domestic services, and to foreign 
and local trademarks, copyrights and patents.65 
National treatment provisions in patent laws are even older 
than WTO standards, having roots in the Paris Convention of 1883. 
 
62 “The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of 
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and 
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use.” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. III, ¶ 4, (Oct. 30, 
1947), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm [https://perma.cc
/2BS6-TKZ8]. 
63 “[E]ach Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, 
in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favourable 
than that it accords to its own like services and service suppliers.”  General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, Annex 1B, art. XVII (Apr. 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org
/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm [https://perma.cc/P2CK-KSJ4]. 
64 “Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less 
favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of 
intellectual property, subject to the exceptions already provided in, respectively, the Paris 
Convention (1967), the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention or the Treaty on 
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.” Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, art. 3 (Apr. 15, 1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm [https://perma.cc/M65A-
35A8]. 
65 World Trade Organization, Principles of the Trading System, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm [https://perma.cc
/N5TH-AM9K] (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). 
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The Paris Convention requires signatory countries to enact patent 
laws providing for national treatment of foreign inventors. Terms 
of the Paris Convention require that “[n]ationals of countries out-
side the Union [(that is, nationals of non-signatory countries)] who 
are domiciled or who have real and effective industrial or commer-
cial establishments in the territory of one of the countries of the 
Union shall be treated in the same manner as nationals of the coun-
tries of the Union.”66 
Provisions for national treatment under United States patent 
laws are particularly important for foreign inventors given the size 
of the United States economy and the scope of corresponding mar-
kets in this country for patented products and services. United 
States laws define the patent rights governing sales and uses of pa-
tented items in this country and, in turn, shape the commercial 
gains that can be derived from those sales and uses. This follows 
from a second feature of United States patent laws: the “territorial” 
scope of United States patent laws in fully describing patent rights 
within the United States. This feature, which is typical of patent 
systems around the world, means that within the United States pa-
tent laws of this country (and only those laws) govern the allowed 
uses of patented technologies.67 
Combined with national treatment, the territorial characteristics 
of United States patent laws means that foreign inventors can look 
to the full force of United States patent laws to gain invention re-
 
66 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 3 (Sept. 28, 1979), 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [https://perma.cc/VZ64-
XF3D]. 
67 Territorial scope is a feature of patent laws around the world. Thus, German patent 
law governs what may be done with a technology if patented in that country, while 
French patent law governs what may be done with the same technology if patented in that 
country. If no patent is obtained in a given country, a publicly disclosed technology 
typically can be used freely in that country (subject to other legal standards such as health 
and safety laws that might still curtail certain uses). Of course, once a product is sought to 
be exported from a country where no constraints apply into a country where patent rights 
are applicable, the patent laws of the latter may restrict the importation, sale, distribution, 
and use of the product. See, e.g., World Intellectual Property Association, What Is a 
Patent?,  https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/ [https://perma.cc/TJ8S-MLTJ] (last visited on 
Jan. 2, 2019) (“Patents are territorial rights. In general, the exclusive rights are only 
applicable in the country or region in which a patent has been filed and granted, in 
accordance with the law of that country or region.”). 
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wards in the United States economy. Inventors around the world 
are thereby brought into the United States patent system and en-
couraged to produce the types of advances desired by consumers 
here. 
Of course, the opposite is true for United States inventors, who 
are reciprocally incentivized by foreign patent systems to produce 
items desired by foreign consumers. For example, innovators in the 
United States are incentivized and benefitted by national treatment 
under provisions of German patent laws.68 These provisions speci-
fy that a party producing an invention in the United States is enti-
tled to obtain a patent in Germany under the same standards and 
procedures as a German citizen and to gain whatever commercial 
rewards are available under such a patent. Thus, German laws en-
courage United States innovators to produce advances valued in 
Germany, to the extent that these are different than those valued in 
the United States. 
National treatment also encourages innovators to consider the 
world-wide demand for various types of innovations (that its, the 
aggregate commercial demand in the United States, Germany, and 
multiple other countries to the extent that patents are obtained in 
those countries) when considering the overall commercial potential 
for new innovations. Many advances, addressing common con-
cerns such as health and safety, will have parallel utility and com-
mercial value in multiple countries. Where the desires of consum-
ers for new technologies are similar in multiple countries, national 
treatment provisions of patent laws ensure that the incentives for 
meeting the common desires add up to produce elevated incentives 
reflecting the combined interest in innovations. 
National treatment provisions in patent systems of foreign 
countries—now combined with patent application aids such as 
provisions of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) that streamline 
patent applications in multiple countries69—ensure that parties 
 
68 See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, 2015 Investment Climate Statement – Germany, May 
2015, https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241572.htm [https://perma.cc/99TJ-
2ZS6] (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) (“Foreigners may register patents subject to exactly the 
same terms as German nationals at the German Patent and Trade Mark Office.”). 
69 For an overview of the Patent Cooperation Treaty system and its advantages in 
promoting patent applications in multiple countries, see World Intellectual Property 
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producing advances valued in multiple countries can gain patents 
and patent rewards across those countries. The resulting sum of 
rewards available in multiple patent systems promotes innovation 
above and beyond the incentives of any one patent system, encour-
aging attention to advances with value and commercial potential 
across many countries. 
While the availability of patent rewards in multiple countries 
due to national treatment provisions is important in driving and 
prioritizing international technology development, for the sake of 
simplicity, this article focuses on the impact of national treatment 
provisions in just the United States and the implications of these 
provisions for international technology development. The article 
examines the potential for United States patent laws and associated 
commercial rewards from the United States economy to incentivize 
and encourage new technology production and cultivation else-
where. In considering cross-border patent rewards emanating from 
the United States, the article treats these rewards as inducements 
for foreign inventions that can substitute for home country incen-
tives where patent laws are weak or are of little commercial value. 
While other factors, such as gaps in technical expertise, supporting 
infrastructure, or research financing, may still limit the develop-
ment of new technologies in some foreign countries, the availabil-
ity of commercial rewards in the United States can help put inno-
vators in foreign countries on the same plane as their United States 
counterparts and encourage these foreign innovators (and compa-
nies or investors who support them) to target and pursue new tech-
nology development efforts with high profit potential and utility. 
 
Organization, Summary of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (2018), http://
www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/pct/summary_pct.html [https://perma.cc/9AZZ-
JGJY] (last visited Sept. 3, 2018). The PCT makes it possible to seek patent protection 
for an invention simultaneously in many countries by filing an “international” patent 
application (typically referred to as a “PCT Application”). Ultimately, an applicant filing 
such an application can determine whether it will be submitted to and considered by 
patent offices in specific countries that adhere to the PCT (which now include most major 
industrialized nations). Additional provisions of the PCT include timing provisions 
regarding the filing of patent applications that are generally more favorable to patent 
applicants than the timing deadlines that would prevail if the applicants filed applications 
directly with patent offices in specific countries. See id. 
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B. Purposes Underlying National Treatment in Patent Laws 
Requirements of national treatment for international technolo-
gy innovators serve several valuable purposes. These include en-
suring fairness to foreign providers of useful technologies, simpli-
fying legal disputes involving patent rights, encouraging interna-
tional propagation of new technologies, and promoting equally-
situated competition among international producers of products 
incorporating patented features or utilizing patented production 
methods. 
1. Ensuring Fairness to Foreign Inventors 
National treatment provisions of patent laws are motivated par-
tially by fairness concerns about possible discrimination against 
foreign actors.70 In the specific sphere of technology development, 
discrimination against foreign actors may involve the misappropri-
ation and use of technologies originated by these parties without 
compensation or with less compensation than would have been 
given if the actors were domestic rather than foreign parties. As 
parties rely on and gain value from foreign-originated new tech-
nologies, fairness dictates that the foreign inventors originating 
valuable technologies receive the same rewards for their inventions 
as domestic parties producing similarly valuable technologies. 
Fairness requires equal treatment for equal value rendered to inno-
vation users. A moral entitlement to a reward derives from an act 
of invention coupled with the addition to the public sphere of utili-
ty gains resulting from use of the invention.71 The utility gained 
 
70 National treatment provisions ensure that “all persons are equal before the law. 
Using the same law in each country for every litigant minimizes discrimination against 
the foreigner.” David R. Toraya, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign Copyright 
Infringement Actions – An Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 
1165, 1171 (1985). See also Thad W. Simons Jr., International Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights, 79 AM. J. INT’L L 1115–16 (1985).  
71 A moral basis for patent rights and associated patent-influenced rewards to 
successful inventors for transfers of useful inventions to society stems from a Lockian 
view of labor and property. John Locke argued that labor invested in a project should 
result in property ownership of the project results. As summarized by Adam Moore and 
Ken Himma, the Lockean justification of patent law “begins with the claim that 
individuals are entitled to control the fruits of their labor….Laboring, producing, 
thinking, and persevering are voluntary, and individuals who engage in these activities 
are entitled to what they produce. Subject to certain restrictions, rights are generated 
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from an invention—and, correspondingly, the entitlement to a re-
ward—is the same regardless of the location of the act of invention 
or the citizenship of the inventor. National treatment of inventors 
helps to ensure that this moral entitlement is realized by inventors 
who gain patents; they receive patent-influenced rewards regard-
less of citizenship or invention location. 
Of course, the scope of rewards for particular inventions will 
vary with both the popularity of the inventions with the public and 
the provisions of applicable patent laws in individual countries. 
However, taking these factors into account, the resulting patent-
influenced rewards for a given invention in a given country should 
be equal for inventors from all countries. All inventors, regardless 
of location or nationality, have equal moral claims for rewards 
based on valuable acts of invention and corresponding contribu-
tions to public utility. National treatment provisions help to ensure 
that these sorts of equal claims to patent rewards are satisfied and 
that foreign and domestic inventors are given fair and equal access 
to commercial opportunities influenced by patent rights. 
2. Simplifying Patent Enforcement Litigation 
Another benefit of national treatment under patent laws is that 
patent enforcement disputes are simplified by applying the same 
country laws to all patents in a given country regardless of where 
patented inventions were made. As noted by David R. Toraya, na-
tional treatment has several beneficial impacts on patent litigation: 
[N]ational treatment provides practical benefits for both the 
courts and the litigants in allowing for the application of forum 
law. Courts prefer to apply their own law, with which they are fa-
 
when individuals mix their labor with an unowned object.” Adam Moore & Ken Himma, 
Intellectual Property in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta ed.) 
(Winter 2014) (citations omitted), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries
/intellectual-property [https://perma.cc/FV42-7YNY]. “The intuition is that the person 
who clears unowned land, cultivates crops, builds a house, or creates a new invention 
obtains property rights by engaging in these activities. . . .” Id. “The idea is that  . . .  we 
each own our labor and when that labor is mixed with objects in the commons, our rights 
are expanded to include these goods.” Id. Patent rewards result when inventors exchange 
their labor-based ownership of inventions for commercial gains. These gains follow as 
inventors grant access to their inventions (as protected by patents) through 
commercialization transactions. Id. 
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miliar. Similarly, using only one law makes it unnecessary to apply 
a variety of foreign laws within a single transaction or court case. 
Judicial efficiency is served when courts do not have to rely upon 
translations of foreign statutes and case law, and the risk of distort-
ed or inaccurate translations is abated. National treatment thus re-
sults in sounder decisions and increased certainty in the law.72 
In addition to promoting certainty by allowing courts to apply 
familiar home country patent laws in resolving patent cases, na-
tional treatment also increases certainty in patent litigation by 
avoiding threshold disputes over which laws apply to inventions 
made by persons of multiple nationalities.73 For example, in the 
absence of national treatment requirements, the United States 
might provide diminished patent rights to German inventors. Be-
yond the need to keep track of a special set of patent standards 
governing these diminished rights, courts would also have to de-
termine in particular cases whether the diminished rights applied. 
These sorts of threshold disputes about the governing laws would 
be particularly difficult to resolve in cases where an invention was 
produced by persons of multiple nationalities such as a team of 
German and United States scientists. National treatment standards 
make the composition of such teams irrelevant and reduce litiga-
tion uncertainty accordingly by focusing attention of courts and 
litigants on a single set of patent laws which is ascertainable from 
the outset of relevant cases.74 
3. Encouraging International Propagation of New 
Technologies 
National treatment under patent laws also helps to ensure that 
foreign technology innovators have incentives to bring new tech-
nologies into a country without fear that the technology will be 
copied freely because the foreign party is unable to gain rights con-
trolling the use of the technology. One impact is to encourage in-
 
72 Toraya, supra note 70, at 1171; see also Simons Jr., supra note 70. 
73 See Toraya, supra note 70, at 1172 (noting the clarifying effect of national treatment 
in determining that the law to be applied in patent disputes is generally that of the country 
where patent infringement is asserted to have occurred regardless of the nationality of the 
inventors involved). 
74 See id. 
2019] THE POWER OF DISTANT REWARDS 897 
 
novators to rely on patent protections (with public disclosures of 
intentions) rather than on trade secret protections (with continuing 
secrecy about inventions). Absent national treatment protections 
for foreign-originated technologies, overseas technology producers 
would try to restrict their technologies as trade secrets, thereby 
limiting public access to the advances and hindering the propaga-
tion of the advances to new countries. National treatment guaran-
tees in other countries reassure innovators that they will have 
meaningful patent rights in overseas settings and that they can rely 
on patent laws to protect disclosed technologies rather than re-
stricting access to the technologies under trade secret controls. 
National treatment protections also promote international prop-
agation of technical “know-how” needed to fully utilize patented 
inventions. Where an innovator obtains a patent on an advance in 
one country (thereby revealing the advance to the public through 
the description in the patent), the innovator might still seek to re-
strict widespread use of the advance in other countries by main-
taining close control over private know how needed to fully use the 
publicly disclosed technology. Patent rights in overseas settings, 
ensured in part by national treatment standards, help to reassure an 
innovator that he or she can bring a new patented technology into a 
country and rely on patent controls in that country to prevent unau-
thorized use of the technology there. Once a patent is obtained in a 
foreign nation and an innovator can rely on national treatment 
there, the inventor’s need to rely on know how access restrictions 
to maintain control over a new technology there will be lessened, 
and fewer controls will tend to be imposed. 
Rather than trying to restrict access to their new advances, in-
novators will have reasons to encourage and support more use of 
new technologies in countries where patents are obtained. With 
patent rights in a foreign venue allowing the rights holder to charge 
for the use of a patented technology in that venue, a patent holder 
has a direct stake in expanded use of a patented advance in the 
venue. Because of this, a technology innovator with a foreign pa-
tent strengthened by national treatment guarantees will be encour-
aged to bring a new technology into the venue along with the per-
sonnel and trade secret knowledge needed to assist licensees or 
other authorized parties to maximize use of the technology. The 
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more authorized and paid for use of the patented technology, the 
more the patent holder will stand to gain in the foreign venue. Ab-
sent viable patent rights backed up by national treatment guaran-
tees, the technology originator will have incentives to resist this 
type of potentially uncompensated technology transfer by all 
means possible. 
4. Promoting Competition Between Producers in Multiple 
Countries 
Provisions for national treatment also tend to discourage free 
riding in international commerce as firms in multiple countries 
produce goods that are destined for competition in other countries. 
Absent national treatment, an innovator might be able to gain con-
trol over a new technology in his or her home country but see the 
technology used freely in a second country because the foreign 
party was precluded from gaining or enforcing patent rights in that 
country. Goods produced with the freely used technology in the 
second country would be produced at a lower cost than equivalent 
goods produced in the first country where patent controls, and 
charges for use of the technology, applied. As producers of the 
same goods in the first and second countries competed for sales in 
a third country, the producers in the second country where patent 
holders received no rewards would be significantly advantaged. 
National treatment ensures that the technology innovator can gain 
rights to his or her technology in the second country and can 
charge for the technology’s use there in the same manner that the 
originator charges in his or her home country. This, in turn, helps 
to equalize production costs for uses of technology worldwide and 
protects an equal plane of competition among producers in multi-
ple countries regarding products incorporating patented advances 
(or manufacturing using patented advances) no matter where that 
later competition occurs. 
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IV. UTILIZING THE NATIONAL TREATMENT BENEFITS OF UNITED 
STATES PATENTS 
A. Widespread Lost Opportunities—The Missing Patents 
Remarkably, given the potential opportunities afforded through 
United States patents, many inventors located outside the United 
States are apparently failing to seek out the patents needed to gain 
valuable rewards from the United States economy.75 Foreign inno-
vators pursue low rates of United States patenting, despite the 
presence in many countries of substantial research and develop-
ment (R&D) spending and extensive innovation resources such as 
large numbers of recent doctoral degree recipients and highly ac-
tive academic communities. This subsection reviews the evidence 
indicating that innovators in many countries with substantial R&D 
capabilities are not taking the opportunities afforded by national 
treatment under United States patent laws. These countries reflect 
noticeably low patenting rates given their R&D expenditures. 
Countries where innovators are apparently foregoing the incen-
tives offered under United States patent laws stand in contrast to a 
few countries where inventors are embracing these incentives. 
There, United States patenting is at high rates relative to R&D lev-
els. The rates of patenting in some countries are even higher than 
for United States inventors, suggesting that innovators in these 
countries have chosen to emphasize patented technology innova-
tion and exports of valuable technologies to the United States to 
gain compensation through United States patent enforcement. A 
 
75 As explored more fully in subsection 1 below, innovators in many countries with 
substantial R&D spending are not translating such spending into advances covered by 
United States patent applications. For example, innovators in China are seeking United 
States patents at about one tenth the rate per dollar of R&D spending as United States 
inventors. For fiscal year 2016, the rate of United States patent applications per dollar of 
R&D spending for United States inventors was about 641.25, while the comparable rate 
for Chinese inventors was only 68.30. Additional rates of patenting per R&D spending 
dollar for other countries are contained in Figure 1 below. These rates are based on R&D 
spending figures and patent application counts. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra 
note 7, at 37, tbl.4–5; U.S. Patent Office, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
FY17 172 (2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFY17PAR
.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS37-UTTF].  
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few of the countries with this United States patenting strategy are 
profiled in subsection IV.C of this article. 
1. Indicators of Low Patenting Despite Substantial R&D 
Spending 
The low United States patenting levels for innovators in many 
countries with substantial R&D spending is apparent from 
measures of patenting per R&D spending dollar. Such measures 
adjust patenting patterns to eliminate the effects of economy size 
differences across countries and associated differences in R&D 
spending. Countries with relatively low patenting per R&D spend-
ing dollar are either 1) not producing patentable advances (focus-
ing instead on lesser advances or not achieving substantial num-
bers of advances at all) or, 2) despite producing patentable advanc-
es, are making choices about legal and commercial strategies in 
foreign commercialization that forego United States patenting and 
the potential rewards for such patenting. 
The following figure summarizes the patenting per R&D 
spending patterns for the ten countries with the top R&D spending 
levels76: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 R&D spending amounts used in this figure were extracted from NATIONAL SCIENCE 
BOARD, supra note 7, tbl.4–5, at 37. All of the R&D spending amounts reflect estimates 
in current purchasing power parity (PPP) United States dollars. Patent application counts 
used this figure were extracted from United States Patent Office, supra note 75.The 
country source of patent applications with inventors from more than one country was 
presumed to be the country of the lead inventor. See United States Patent Office, supra 
note 75. The US applications per R&D spending rates in the last column of Figure 5 
simply reflect the ratios of the figures in the first two columns. For example, the rate 
shown in the third column of Figure 5 for United States inventors reflected the number of 
applications by United States inventors in fiscal year 2016 divided by the amount of 
R&D spending in the United States or 318701 / 497 = 641.25. 
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FIGURE 5  
 
Many of these countries reflect about the same levels of United 
States patent applications per R&D spending, suggesting that large 
differences in raw patent numbers across these countries may 
mainly reflect differences in the sizes of country research efforts or 
associated differences in country economy sizes. Using the United 
States values in this figure as an indication of baseline or “typical” 
levels of R&D conversion to patent applications, similar but mod-
estly lower levels are present for innovators in Japan and Korea. 
Innovators in these countries appear to be translating R&D funding 
into patentable advances and United States patent applications at 
about the same rates as their United States counterparts. 
The same is not true, however, for innovators in Europe (at 
least within the countries shown). Lower (but roughly consistent) 
patenting levels are present across several European technology 
producers, including the United Kingdom (322.26 patent applica-
tions per billion dollars R&D spending), Switzerland (325.67), 
US Patent Applications FY 2016
Country
R&D 
Amount 
(Billion $)
Number 
of Apps 
2016
US Apps 
per R&D
 United States 497 318701 641.25
 China 409 27935 68.30
 Japan 170 91383 537.55
 Germany 115 33254 289.17
 South Korea 74 41823 565.18
 France 61 13489 221.13
 United Kingdom 46 14824 322.26
 Switzerland 18 5862 325.67
 Netherlands 17 6676 392.71
 Sweden 15 5699 379.93
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Netherlands (392.71), and Sweden (379.93).77 Yet, even the best of 
these R&D to patenting conversion rates is well below that for the 
United States. For example, controlling for differences in R&D 
spending levels, innovators in the United Kingdom sought patents 
at a rate that was only about 50% of the counterpart rate in the 
United States. 
Two European technology giants—Germany (289.17) and 
France (221.13)—show patenting rates that are even lower.78 
These rates are lower than for several European counterparts. For 
example, the R&D to patenting conversion rate for German inno-
vators is only about 74% of that for researchers in the Netherlands. 
Even more dramatically, the rates for Germany and France are on-
ly about 45% and 34% of the rate for United States inventors. Why 
innovators in Germany and France are pursuing United States pa-
tents at such low levels is not clear. Some possible reasons for low 
patenting rates are considered in subsection IV(B) below. 
Finally, among these top sources of United States patent appli-
cations in 2016, the patenting rates for China are especially low. 
Adjusted for R&D spending levels of the two countries, the rate for 
Chinese innovators (68.30) was only about 11% of the rate for 
United States innovators.79 Clearly, there are substantial differ-
ences in the ways that Chinese R&D spending is converted into 
United States patents in comparison with the same conversion pro-
cess in the United States. 
China is not alone among countries with large economies that 
have extremely low conversion rates. Other large countries with 
low R&D spending to patenting rates include80: 
 
 
 
77 These rates are based on reported R&D spending figures and patent application 
counts. See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7,  ch. 4, at tbl.4–5; United States 
Patent Office, supra note 75. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 See NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 4, at tbl.4–5 (R&D spending 
amounts in PPP U.S. dollars); United States Patent Office, supra note 75 (U.S. patent 
application counts). 
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FIGURE 6 
 
Along with innovators in China, researchers in these countries 
rarely seek compensation for advances in United States markets 
via United States patents, measuring their efforts in relation to the 
R&D spending to patenting conversion processes utilized by Unit-
ed States innovators. The conversion rates for R&D spending to 
patenting for innovators in India was only about 24% of the rate 
for United States innovators. The corresponding rates for research-
ers in Russia and Brazil were only about 4% of their United States 
counterpart. 
As reflected in the low patenting rates for many countries 
spending large amounts on research and development activities, 
many innovators in these countries are failing to pursue compensa-
tion for their advances through the sorts of United States patent-
mediated rewards sought by United States innovators. The reasons 
for this gap—that is, for the missing patents corresponding to high 
levels of research in many of these countries—are explored in sub-
section B below. 
2. Indicators of Low Patenting Despite Substantial Country 
Expertise 
Several other indicators confirm the low patenting rates for 
some countries with large innovation capabilities. One key factor 
affecting research capabilities from country to country is expertise 
in cutting edge science and technology. Differences across coun-
tries in numbers of recent doctoral degree recipients in science and 
US Patent Applications Fiscal Year 2016 ‐‐
Additional Countries
Country
R&D 
Amount 
(Billion $)
Number 
of Apps 
2016
US Apps 
per R&D
India 50 7676 153.52
Russia 38 1102 29.00
Brazil 38 968 25.47
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engineering fields provide rough measures of the expertise differ-
ences. Countries with large numbers of recent degree recipients in 
science and technology fields should have stronger research capa-
bilities than countries with fewer such degree recipients. 
Using recent PhD degrees as a research resource indicator pro-
duces further evidence of low patenting in countries that expertise 
levels suggest should be major innovators. Taking into account on-
ly degrees in science and engineering fields, ratios of patent appli-
cations in the United States in 2016 to PhDs in 2014 vary substan-
tially across countries. These ratios indicate the number of patent 
applications each country would be predicted to produce if the 
countries had equal numbers of recent PhD recipients in science 
and engineering fields, all else being equal across the countries. 
The following figure summarizes these variations for several of the 
largest sources of United States patents (countries are listed here in 
descending order of R&D spending)81: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
81 The earned doctorate counts in this figure are extracted from NATIONAL SCIENCE 
BOARD, supra note 7, at app. tbl. 2–37. The patent application counts per country are 
extracted from U.S. Patent Office, supra note 75, at Table 9.  
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FIGURE 7 
 
 
As with the evidence drawn from R&D spending, there are at 
least three levels of patenting apparent in this data. First, patenting 
per PhD in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan was 
similar, indicating that innovators sought about the same numbers 
of patents per new PhD. Within this group, patents per new PhD 
were notably higher for Japanese innovators than for innovators in 
the other three countries. Whether the high figure for Japanese in-
novators stems from more aggressive patenting practices, fewer 
Country
PhDs 
2014 
(1000s)
Number 
of Apps 
2016
US Apps 
per 1000 
PhDs
United States 40 318701 8000.73
China 34 27935 819.14
Japan 7 91383 13552.28
Germany 15 33254 2273.78
South Korea 6 41823 6933.52
France 10 13489 1345.80
India 13 7676 583.99
United Kingdom 14 14824 1038.75
Brazil 9 968 106.09
Russia (2013) 19 1102 56.98
Taiwan 2 20875 8393.65
Italy 6 5871 949.23
Canada 5 14328 2761.76
Australia 5 4013 824.87
Spain 7 1902 283.54
Total 15 Countries  193 598144 3104.47
Total All Sources 230 650411 2827.87
US Patent Applications per 1000 PhDs
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recent PhDs, or other factors affecting either patenting or PhD lev-
els is not clear from this data. 
Second, Germany and Canada had roughly similar amounts of 
patents per PhD, but at levels much lower than that of the United 
States. The rate for Germany, for example, was only about 28% of 
the rate for United States innovators. Despite being below the 
comparable rate for the United States, the rate for German innova-
tors was higher than the rates for innovators in the other European 
countries listed. 
Third, China was again at a much lower level of patenting. The 
rate of patenting per PhD graduate for Chinese innovators was only 
about 10% of that for innovators from the United States. China’s 
rate was comparable to those of several other technology sources 
across the world, including (in descending order) France, the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Italy, Australia, and India. While this suggests that 
recent PhDs and the expertise they add to technology development 
may be producing the same levels of new United States patent ap-
plications from China as from the other countries listed in this par-
agraph, the low rates of patenting per PhD in all of these countries 
compared to the United States is striking. The patenting rate per 
new PhD was even lower for innovations from Russia. 
While the results for some countries are a bit different (Germa-
ny seems to lag in patenting per R&D spending but performed 
stronger in patenting per PhD, and the United Kingdom shows the 
opposite pattern in these two analyses), this additional perspective 
on patenting levels across countries suggests that innovators in a 
number of countries are not seeking compensation for advances at 
levels that country-specific expertise would predict. Put another 
way, in countries like Germany and Canada, the levels of expertise 
reflected in their recent PhD levels would suggest patenting rates 
should be about four times higher were German and Canadian in-
novators to seek rewards via United States patents in the same 
manner as United States innovators. In countries like China, 
France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Australia, India, and Russia, 
recent expertise additions (as reflected in counts of recent science 
and engineering PhDs) indicate that innovators should be seeking 
United States patents at about ten times their present rates to match 
their United States counterparts. 
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3. Indicators of Low Patenting Despite Substantial Academic 
Outputs 
Academic research article outputs provide yet another rough 
measure of research capabilities across countries. Countries with 
large numbers of published academic articles in science and engi-
neering fields will generally reflect more active research programs 
than countries with lower numbers of articles.82 The following fig-
ure summarizes patenting levels for several countries that are the 
largest producers of academic articles (countries are listed here in 
descending order of R&D spending)83: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, ch. 5, at 92 (“The output volume 
of research, article counts, is one basic indicator of the degree to which different 
performers contribute to the world’s production of research-based [science and 
engineering] knowledge.”). 
83 The article counts in this figure are extracted from NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, supra 
note 7, at app. tbl. 5–27. The patent application counts per country are extracted from 
United States Patent Office, supra note 75, tbl.9, at 174. 
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FIGURE 8 
 
This data on patenting per academic article confirms two pat-
terns seen in the previous analysis of patenting per R&D spending. 
First, patenting levels (and associated attempts to obtain invention 
rewards via United States patents) are roughly the same across a 
top tier of countries including the United States, Japan, South Ko-
rea, and Taiwan (as measured from patenting per academic article). 
Second, patenting rates are much lower for innovators in China 
and India as measured from patenting per academic article. Patent-
ing rates per academic article were similarly low for Brazil, Russia, 
Italy, and Spain. Innovators in these last six countries are produc-
Country
Number 
of S&E 
Articles 
2016
Percent of 
All S&E 
Articles 
2016
Number 
of Apps 
2016
US Apps 
per 
Article
United States 408985 17.82% 318701 0.78
China 426165 18.56% 27935 0.07
Japan 96536 4.21% 91383 0.95
Germany 103122 4.49% 33254 0.32
South Korea 63063 2.75% 41823 0.66
France 69431 3.02% 13489 0.19
India 110320 4.81% 7676 0.07
United Kingdom 97527 4.25% 14824 0.15
Brazil 53607 2.34% 968 0.02
Russia (2013) 59134 2.58% 1102 0.02
Taiwan 27385 1.19% 20875 0.76
Italy 69125 3.01% 5871 0.08
Canada 57356 2.50% 14328 0.25
Australia 51068 2.22% 4013 0.08
Spain 52821 2.30% 1902 0.04
Total 15 Countries  1798465 78.34% 598144 0.33
Total All Sources 2295608 100.00% 650411 0.28
US Patent Applications per Article
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ing academic works at substantial rates (as indicated by their status 
among the world’s top producers of published articles in science 
and engineering fields), but innovators in these countries, including 
technology giants China and India, appear to seek United States 
patents at much lower rates per academic article. 
For example, the rate of conversion of academic work to pa-
tented advances for Chinese innovators (treating the topic of each 
article as a project potentially leading to an advance) is about 8% 
of the rate for innovators in the United States. Put another way, if 
academic work in China was converted to United States patent ap-
plications at the same rate as similar academic research in the 
United States, we would expect Chinese patent filings in the Unit-
ed States (and corresponding attempts to gain rewards for innova-
tion in the United States) to be over ten times the levels actually 
observed. Chinese innovators, and their counterparts in India who 
have similarly low patenting rates, are seeking United States pa-
tents for inventions at much lower rates than the academic research 
in these countries would predict. 
B. Possible Reasons for the Missing Patents 
The low patenting rates seen for Chinese, Indian, Russian, Bra-
zilian and some other innovators outside the United States may be 
the result of at least four different factors: 1) lack of production of 
patentable advances; 2) production of patentable advances with so 
little commercial potential that patenting is not cost justified; 3) 
production of valuable, patentable advances for which no United 
States patents are desired or sought; or 4) production of valuable, 
patentable advances for which United States patents are desired but 
resources needed to gain and enforce such patents are lacking. 
These possible reasons for the findings above are explored briefly 
in this subsection. Further research will be needed to determine the 
relative importance of these possible explanations (or if there are 
yet additional reasons for the low patenting rates documented 
here). 
1. Research Spending Does Not Produce Patentable Advances 
One possible reason why innovators in some countries seek far 
fewer United States patents per R&D expenditure than innovators 
910          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:861 
 
in the United States is that research spending in these countries 
may produce fewer patentable advances per dollar spent. There are 
two possible ways that this might result: 
First, foreign research may not be as successful as in the United 
States, leading to fewer inventions per R&D spending dollar. This 
is another way of saying that foreign researchers may not spend 
their research dollars as effectively or efficiently as their United 
States counterparts. The reasons for this are impossible to deter-
mine from the present data. 
Alternatively, foreign researchers may work as efficiently as 
researchers in the United States—in the sense of inventions pro-
duced per research dollar spent—but create mostly inventions that 
do not qualify for patents. This would reflect a different emphasis 
in research than in the United States. If foreign research spending 
mostly supports predictable research to produce obvious adjust-
ments to prior technology designs and processes, then R&D spend-
ing will produce mostly unpatentable advances. A large fraction of 
unpatentable advances, or even a mix of advances with a greater 
fraction of unpatentable advances than in the United States, would 
produce the sorts of low patenting rates described previously. 
Whether a heavy emphasis on relatively mundane research ex-
plains the low patenting per research expenditures seen in the 
above data will require more detailed study of the aims and results 
of research in the various countries with low patenting rates. 
2. Patentable Advances Produced Are Not Commercially 
Important 
Another possible reason behind the low patenting rates for in-
novators in some countries is that patentable advances are being 
made at about the same invention per R&D spending rates as in the 
United States, but the potentially patentable advances made in 
these countries are perceived by their originators as having little 
commercial value in the United States. Consequently, the cost of 
obtaining and enforcing patents in the United States appears unjus-
tified and no patents are sought. 
This may reflect a difference in targeting of innovation, with 
inventors in foreign settings producing new and non-obvious outli-
er advances much like their United States counterparts, but lacking 
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a sense of commercial need. Foreign innovators, more than their 
United States counterparts, may also lack resources to tailor raw 
academic findings to consumer needs and thereby perfect patenta-
ble products that have commercial potential. 
Such gaps in targeting invention efforts might result if many 
potential inventors in a country were applying research spending to 
produce pure academic findings without adjusting academic goals 
to reflect the commercial potential of particular lines of research. 
Similar divergence of research away from commercial targets 
might also result from infrequent involvement of commercial enti-
ties in research in some foreign countries, causing a greater frac-
tion of research targeting, and resulting research spending, to be 
undertaken without aiming at the commercial potential of research 
results. 
3. Patentable Advances Produced but US Patents Are Not 
Desired 
Yet another possible basis for the low patenting rates for some 
countries seen in the above findings is that innovators in these 
countries, or the institutions that support them and that are the po-
tential recipients of patent assignments based on innovations by the 
foreign researchers, do not value and pursue United States patents 
even for commercially important and potentially patentable ad-
vances. This failure to prioritize and pursue United States patents 
might stem from gaps in information about: 1) the substantive re-
quirements for obtaining a patent, 2) the availability of full patent 
rights in the United States for foreign inventors, or 3) how to go 
about getting and enforcing a United States patent. Alternatively, a 
low priority placed on obtaining a United States patent may reflect 
a substantive choice to emphasize values favoring free access to 
intellectual discoveries and to reject intellectual property interests 
like patents that may limit public access to certain advances. 
Whatever the reason, the choice to forego a United States pa-
tent for a potentially patentable item with substantial value in the 
United States simply sacrifices some of the compensation available 
to inventors for useful advances. This failure is effectively a gift to 
United States consumers. Even if an inventor gains a patent in his 
or her home country, the failure to obtain a patent in the United 
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States will forego the substantial patent-influenced rewards availa-
ble from the world’s largest economy for advances that consumers 
in the United States find useful. 
More fundamentally, the failure to plan for patenting of a tar-
geted advance means that United States patent rewards are not part 
of the financing and resource allocation decisions underlying re-
search endeavors. Where foreign research programs are targeted 
and planned with careful attention to obtaining and enforcing, or 
assigning away, patents on inventions valued in the United States, 
the economic force of American market demand and commerciali-
zation of new advances can be placed behind foreign research ef-
forts. 
By contrast, if United States patenting is foregone, then patent-
based financing support is sacrificed to the detriment of both for-
eign researchers and United States consumers. Parties making this 
choice against United States patenting will not only forego support 
for their research efforts; they may also find themselves disadvan-
taged when competing with other researchers who are counting on 
United States patents for valuable advances and gaining associated 
research support. Researchers who understand the potential of 
United States patenting, who are sharp enough to create research 
plans with patenting components, who gain increased funding and 
resource allocations, and who complete more extensive and suc-
cessful research accordingly are likely to prevail over less well 
supported researchers working without reliance on United States 
patents. 
4. Resources are Lacking to Gain and Enforce Patents 
Finally, low patenting rates per R&D dollar spent may result 
because, although innovators in other countries are producing val-
uable, patentable advances at about the same rates as their United 
States counterparts and desire United States patents; the overseas 
innovators lack the resources needed to obtain and enforce related 
United States patents. The funds needed to obtain patents and to 
mount viable enforcement efforts may be essential to establish the 
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value of patents in United States markets.84 Patents obtained with-
out the expenditure of sufficient resources to produce carefully 
drafted patents may lack meaningful value because they are drafted 
in ways that fail to limit the most commercially valuable uses of 
new advances. Even well-drafted patents may lack practical value 
if a patent holder does not have resources to mount meaningful pa-
tent litigation against infringers. Absent the capability to support 
such litigation, a patent holder will appear to be no more than a 
paper tiger. Parties with commercial interests in a patented inven-
tion will simply use the invention as infringers without paying li-
censing fees or feeling threats of infringement injunctions or dam-
age awards. 
While the resources needed to gain and enforce patents in the 
United States are not small,85 there are three reasons why the size 
of these resources need not be a barrier to reliance on United States 
patents for support of foreign innovation. First, patent enforcement 
specialists (sometimes referred to as “nonpracticing entities” or, 
less favorably, “patent trolls”86) are increasingly willing to acquire 
 
84 Gene Quinn has estimated the typical costs for filing a United States utility patent 
application for different types of inventions: 1) computer implemented method for 
facilitating certain functionality via the Internet ($19,930 to $22,880), 2) consumer 
electronics product ($14,080), and 3) mechanical tool ($12,080). He additionally 
estimated post-filing costs of about $5,000 to $7,500 for USPTO fees and post-filing 
attorneys’ services needed to gain an issued patent. See Gene Quinn, The Cost of 
Obtaining a Patent in the US, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-
us/id=56485/ [https://perma.cc/9D4G-LZ8D]; see also Kiah Treece, How Much Does a 
Patent Cost? Types, Factors & Ways to Save (June 26, 2018), 
https://fitsmallbusiness.com/how-much-does-a-patent-cost/ [https://perma.cc/ZE55-
LT6F]. Substantial additional amounts will often need to be expended to enforce the 
resulting patents. See Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of Patent Litigation, 
IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 5, 2013), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-
of-patent-litigation/id=34808/ [https://perma.cc/6HBK-XXYM] (“According to the 
American Intellectual Property Law Association, the cost of an average patent lawsuit, 
where $1 million to $25 million is at risk, is $1.6 million through the end of discovery 
and $2.8 million through final disposition.”). 
85 See Quinn, supra note 84; see also Treece, supra note 84. 
86 For a description of nonpracticing entities and their activities, see Federal Trade 
Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity (Oct. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftc-
study/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N83Q-RAAX]. 
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United States patents covering inventions with value in this coun-
try, thereby creating an immediate market payoff for some patents 
and shifting the patent enforcement burden to the acquiring enti-
ties. Patents may also be acquired by practicing companies (that is, 
companies that will use or “practice” the patented invention in 
some way), resulting in similar compensation to the former patent 
owners. Second, a party obtaining a valuable patent can often grant 
an exclusive license to the patent to another entity (often a large 
company with production and marketing capabilities regarding 
products incorporating the patented invention), thereby generating 
licensing royalties and shifting the burden and cost of patent en-
forcement to the licensing party. Third, where a company both pa-
tents a new advance and begins to demonstrate the advance’s 
commercial potential, the company may become an acquisition 
target. If acquired, the compensation paid for the company’s stock 
will be in part a payment for the patent rights that will transfer with 
the company to the acquiring party. The result is another means of 
patent-mediated compensation for the foreign innovator. 
While these sorts of strategies will sometimes reduce patent en-
forcement costs, substantial resources may still be needed to gain 
valuable United States patents and prove the value of related prod-
ucts. The costs of patenting efforts should be part of the planning 
and project justification for particular research efforts. While some 
upfront patent application costs will need to be built into budgets 
and project justifications where parties intend to seek and rely on 
United States patents, substantial commercial opportunities and 
potential future revenues will also be added to planning considera-
tions, with the result that the net value of many projects with 
commercial and patenting potential may be materially increased by 
considering United States patents as additional sources of research 
funding. 
C. A Few Counterexamples – Countries Riding the United States 
Patent Wave 
Researchers in a few countries already appear to be looking 
regularly to United States patents as sources of compensation and 
rewards for successful advances. The evidence of this lies in the 
particularly high R&D spending to patenting conversion rates for a 
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few countries. Countries with higher conversion rates than the rate 
for innovators in the United States are ones where research dollars 
are producing more patents (or at least more patent applications) 
per dollar spent than in the United States. Put another way, assum-
ing arguendo that the various patents gained have similar validity 
and value per patent, countries with high R&D spending to patent-
ing conversion rates have an especially high likelihood of having 
research costs paid for and subsidized by United States consumers. 
The following figure summarizes patenting rates for a few 
countries with especially high conversion rates (the rate for the 
United States is included at the top of the figure for comparison)87: 
FIGURE 9 
 
These technology producers, with conversion rates almost 
equal to innovators in the United States, appear to know how to 
translate research spending into valuable inventions and potential 
United States rewards. Patents in the United States offer these for-
eign innovators substantial chances to recoup invention costs from 
United States sales. Furthermore, a regular pattern of looking to 
United States patents for future returns on invention costs means 
that projects can be targeted, justified, and scaled in accordance 
 
87 R&D spending amounts used in this figure were extracted from NATIONAL 
SCIENCE BOARD, supra note 7, tbl.4–5, at 37. Note that the spending amounts 
represent totals from 2015. The patent application counts per country are ex-
tracted from United States Patent Office, supra note 75, tbl.9, at 174. 
Country
R&D 
Amount 
(Billion $)
Number 
of Apps 
2016
US Apps 
per R&D
United States 497 318701 641.25
Israel 13 8251 634.69
Taiwan 33 20875 632.58
South Korea 74 41823 565.18
Japan 170 91383 537.55
US Patent Applications per R&D Spending
916          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:861 
 
with the resources that United States markets and related patent 
rewards imply. The result will be a greater linkage of invention 
budgeting and targeting to the needs and potential rewards of Unit-
ed States consumers and businesses. The economic potential and 
incentives associated with United States patents encourages over-
seas innovators to be as attuned to United States desires and eco-
nomic support as similar innovators in this country. 
CONCLUSION: STRATEGIES FOR SUBSIDIZING OVERSEAS 
INVENTIONS 
This article has described means to use patent rewards generat-
ed from United States patents to subsidize overseas innovation. It 
has also described the apparent failure of innovators in many coun-
tries to take advantage of these subsidies. This section concludes 
with a summary of means for overseas inventors, and entities that 
support them, to better utilize the research support represented by 
United States patents. 
A. Major Steps to Ensure Technology Development Subsidies 
1. Follow the Markets 
The commercial value of a patented advance ultimately de-
pends on the aggregate amount that parties will pay for access to 
devices or processes incorporating the advance over alternative 
devices or processes that perform the same functions without the 
patented feature. This aggregate amount depends on two important 
market characteristics: first, the number of parties interested in us-
ing the advance and, second, the amount each user will pay to gain 
access to the advance. The value of a patented advance will also 
depend on how much of the payment gained from a party for use 
of the advance can be transformed into profit—that is, the amount 
a user will pay for access to the patented advance, less the incre-
mental production costs (if any) involved in including the patented 
advance in products or services. 
In light of these factors, patent-protected advances with the 
greatest value are not those that rely on the most surprising or fun-
damentally new technology, but rather those advances that are dis-
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tinctively different enough to qualify for a patent and used very 
widely such that patent-influenced product prices can be charged 
for sales of the advances to numerous parties. Aggregate value 
provided in the hands of users is the way to project the potential 
value of advances and to target corresponding research efforts. 
2. Consider Protections in Additional Countries as 
Supplements to United States Patents 
Carrying the principle of “follow the markets” one step further, 
protections in countries outside the United States for advances by 
foreign inventors can add to aggregate rewards and incentives. Pa-
tent protections should be sought in the United States plus addi-
tional foreign countries where patent-influenced sales in additional 
countries will be likely to produce further profits and add to re-
search subsidies from United States patents. This “United States 
plus” strategy for patenting will justify different lists of targeted 
countries for patenting different types of advances. Some consider-
ations to address in picking countries for additional patent applica-
tions beyond applications in the United States include the follow-
ing: 
a) Size of Country Markets 
The three market size factors mentioned above—number of in-
vention users, access price, and profit per payment—may be diffi-
cult to estimate for particular countries, particularly in advance of 
designing, making, and selling products incorporating the inven-
tions in the countries. Unfortunately, patent targeting decisions will 
need to be made at much earlier stages based on speculative infor-
mation about relevant market sizes. 
Given the high degree of uncertainty generally prevailing about 
these factors influencing patent value, it may be wise to use econ-
omy size as a rough indicator of probable market size and patent 
potential in particular countries. Generally, larger economies will 
support more commercial transactions at higher price points than 
smaller economies, meaning that adoptions of patented advances 
(and perhaps the amounts parties will pay for access to the advanc-
es) should tend to increase with economy size. 
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Economy size rather quickly narrows the list of desirable coun-
tries for patent targeting. A relatively small number of countries—
and corresponding patenting targets—conduct the bulk of com-
mercial activity worldwide. The concentration of most world eco-
nomic activity in a few countries implies that most of the patent-
mediated returns from commercial activities can be realized by fo-
cusing on patenting in those countries. The fifteen largest country 
economies88 account for just almost 70% of world economic ac-
tivities (measured on a PPP basis).89  Patenting strategies targeting 
some or all of these fifteen economies will probably capture most 
or all of the patent-influenced profits to be gained from commer-
cially important advances. 
The following figure breaks down the GDP figures for these 
fifteen countries90: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 See U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing 
Power Parity) in THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html [https://perma.cc/GK5G-TKN3] (last visited 
Sept. 5, 2018). 
89 The top 15 economies account for a total of $88,595 billion in GDP versus about 
$127000 billion GDP worldwide. See id. This means that about 88595 / 127000 = .6976 
or 69.76% of worldwide GDP is produced in the top 15 economies. 
90 The GDP values in this figure are stated in PPP US dollars. See id. 
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FIGURE 10 
 
Not all of these 15 countries need be targeted for patenting. In-
deed, even for these countries with some of the world’s largest 
economies, the advantages of adding additional countries (as indi-
cated by their percentages of worldwide GDP) may be small. For 
example, adding patents in Spain to a patenting strategy may only 
add about 1.4% to projected patent-influenced revenues, corre-
sponding to the additional fraction of world GDP potentially con-
trolled by adding these patents. 
A party producing a broadly valuable advance and considering 
which countries to target for international patenting can roughly 
World GDP 2017 (PPP US Dollars)
Country
GDP 
Amount 
(Billion $)
Percent 
of World 
GDP
Cumulative 
Percent
China $23,160 18.24% 18.24%
United States $19,390 15.27% 33.50%
India $9,459 7.45% 40.95%
Japan $5,429 4.27% 45.23%
Germany $4,171 3.28% 48.51%
Russia $4,008 3.16% 51.67%
Indonesia $3,243 2.55% 54.22%
Brazil $3,240 2.55% 56.77%
United Kingdom $2,914 2.29% 59.07%
France $2,836 2.23% 61.30%
Mexico $2,458 1.94% 63.23%
Italy $2,311 1.82% 65.05%
Turkey $2,173 1.71% 66.77%
South Korea $2,029 1.60% 68.36%
Spain $1,774 1.40% 69.76%
Top 15 Countries $88,595 69.76%
World $127,000 100.00%
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estimate the fraction of the world’s commerce he or she will influ-
ence from any tentative list of countries chosen for patenting. The 
fraction of patent-influenced profits potentially resulting from any 
choice of countries will, at best, roughly correspond to the cumula-
tive percent of world GDP in the set of countries chosen. For ex-
ample, were a party to seek patents for an advance in the top five 
countries listed in Figure 10, he or she would hold patent rights 
over almost half of the world’s economy as measured from country 
GDPs. 
However, as explored more thoroughly in the next subsection, 
weaknesses in substantive patent laws or gaps in patent enforce-
ment may make patent controls in some of the listed countries lim-
ited in practical value. Practical limitations of patent enforcement 
may justify downward adjustments in the patent profit estimates 
that GDP figures would otherwise support. This may, in turn, sup-
port omitting some countries from patenting strategies. 
b) Adjustments for Enforcement Effectiveness 
Once tentative choices for patenting countries are made in light 
of the market size criteria mentioned to this point, further adjust-
ments may be desirable in light of the weakness of patent enforce-
ment in particular countries. If it appears that patent rights are 
weakly defined, poorly enforced, or even unavailable, the rights 
will be of little practical value. Patent rights will fail to control 
some or all of the sales and use of products in countries with weak 
enforcement, making it wise to discount the apparent value of pa-
tent rights in these countries to reflect the uncontrolled sales and 
uses. In some cases, this discounting may so reduce the projected 
value of patent rights in a country as to warrant dropping the coun-
try from the list of patenting choices. If patent rights seem unlikely 
to be enforced at all in a country, or if the costs of enforcement 
seem unlikely to justify the very modest advantages gained from 
enforcement, it will not be desirable to pursue patents in that coun-
try no matter how large its GDP. 
However, before making a final choice to drop a country with a 
large GDP from a patenting strategy, two additional factors should 
be taken into account. First, the fact that patent protections are 
presently weak does not necessarily mean that they will stay weak 
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over the potential life of available patents. Even if patents appear 
to be presently of little practical value, signs that patent rights are 
being enforced with increasing regularity and impact may suggest 
that having a patent in the country will be valuable over the life of 
the patent. Even if a patent is only enforceable late in a patent 
term, this will frequently be enough to realize most of the commer-
cial value of a patented invention. Most of the sales of the inven-
tion, and attempts at infringing sales, will not occur early in the life 
of a patent when the patented technology is still being transformed 
into marketable products but rather late in the life of the patent 
when sales of the invention have been heavily promoted and the 
invention has gained substantial popular acceptance.91 If there is a 
prospect that a patent gained today in a given country will have an 
impact on this type of future marketing as the efforts to popularize 
the patented invention mature, then doubts about present unen-
forceability should be overlooked and a patent pursued as a good 
investment in future marketing success. 
Second, even imperfectly enforceable rights may be of signifi-
cant value in an important market. Thus, for example, even a par-
tial patent enforcement effect in a large product market and manu-
facturing source such as China may have significant commercial 
value even if many infringing uses of a patented item slip through 
patent enforcement. The projected value of patent rights in a coun-
try—leaving aside the possibilities of future rights enforcement 
just addressed—should equal the projected value of patent rights in 
 
91 While the tendency of most patented items to generate increased profits at the end of 
a patent term is applicable across many types of inventions, it is particularly significant 
for pharmaceutical advances. As noted by Neel U. Sukhatme and Judd N. L. Cramer: 
“[P]harmaceuticals—due to the long regulatory approval process before the Food and 
Drug Administration, a drug may not even be salable for years into its patent term. 
Indeed, much of the profit for the drug might be obtained in the very last years of its 
patent term.” Neel U. Sukhatme & Judd N. L. Cramer, Who Cares About Patent Term? 
Cross-Industry Differences in Term Sensitivity 5 (Sept. 24, 2014), https://
scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/sukhatme/files/sukhatme_who_cares_about_pate
nt_term_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/B398-L2RN]. Holders of patents on other types of 
inventions also anticipate gaining significant fractions of their patent-influenced profits 
late in the term of their patents. For example, a study of patent holder behaviors found 
that holders of software and computer patents also tended to be particularly interested in 
the terms of their patents, apparently because the last portions of these terms were 
expected to be sources of significant profits. See id. at 2, 45. 
922          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:861 
 
the country if fully enforced, discounted by the likelihood of en-
forcement. This discounted value may still be very high if the full 
enforcement value is high, justifying patent protection in that coun-
try. 
3. Patent in Further Countries to Protect Manufacturing 
Sources 
One exception to the “follow the markets” principle for target-
ing patenting countries is a complementary strategy that emphasiz-
es the potential for manufacturing in various countries. This further 
strategy may justify adding countries as patenting targets based on 
advantages gained from controlling manufacturing in the addition-
al countries. Patenting in these additional countries may be war-
ranted as an indirect means to control patented advances in high 
GDP countries. 
Patent controls aimed at product manufacturing can supple-
ment controls on the manufactured products where they are sold 
and used. Where products are made in Country A but sold and 
used in Country B, two different countries’ patent laws will need to 
be used to gain full control over both manufacturing (governed by 
Country A’s laws) and sales and use (governed by Country B’s 
laws).92 
If a patent holder was confident in controlling and obtaining 
patent-influenced sales or licensing revenues from all sales and 
uses of a patented product in the countries where sales or uses oc-
cur, then no further controls over product manufacturing would be 
needed to realize the full patent rewards for the product. However, 
patent controls over product manufacturing may have several ad-
 
92 The analysis of multi-country patent enforcement strategies for patents covering 
manufactured products is different than the analysis for patents aimed at manufacturing 
itself rather than the products being manufactured. Patents applicable to manufacturing 
equipment or techniques will generally need to be enforced in countries where the 
manufacturing occurs since the sale of unpatented products resulting from the patented 
advances will not be controlled by the relevant patents. Applying manufacturing-related 
patents in the countries where manufacturing occurs is just a special case of the general 
“follow the markets” principle for patent targeting and enforcement. The primary—
indeed, perhaps the exclusive—markets for patented manufacturing equipment and 
techniques are in countries where the associated manufacturing takes place. 
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vantages over a patent enforcement strategy relying exclusively, or 
even predominantly, on controls over product sales or use. 
First, patent enforcement targeting manufacturing may be supe-
rior to enforcement emphasizing product sales or use because of 
differences in the substantive patent laws or patent enforcement 
effectiveness across different countries. If manufacturing occurs in 
Country A with strong patent protections, but product sales and use 
will primarily occur in Country B with weak protections (or will 
occur in numerous countries with uncertain levels of patent protec-
tions), a focus on enforcement against unauthorized manufacturing 
in Country A may make sense. 
Second, focusing patent enforcement on manufacturing may 
have administrative advantages over enforcement aimed at product 
sales and use. Product manufacturing is typically concentrated in a 
few parties and locations, while the latter may be scattered across 
the world. Patent controls over manufacturing may be a convenient 
way to charge one party (a manufacturer licensing the right to 
make a patented item) for the production of many product units or 
to prevent such production if a party will not pay. By limiting 
manufacturing of a patented item through close policing of author-
ized manufacturers, a patent holder can control the downstream 
commercialization of many units of a patented invention through a 
few administrative contacts with authorized manufacturers. 
Third, patent enforcement actions against unauthorized manu-
facturers can avoid the need for suits against product consumers 
that may sour later product sales to the consumers. Where unau-
thorized manufacturers are producing high volumes of knockoff 
patented items and selling these to consumers, it may be far more 
palatable for a patent holder to sue the manufacturer of the 
knockoffs for infringement—and thereby cut off unauthorized 
sources of patented items—than to sue consumers who have pur-
chased or used unauthorized versions of the patented product. 
These consumers will hopefully be future customers for authorized 
versions of the same products. To maintain their goodwill, direct 
patent enforcement suits against these consumers, while technical-
ly available, will be unwise in the context of future product mar-
keting. 
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For all of these reasons, parties may wish to add countries to 
their patenting strategies because the countries are potential manu-
facturing locations (assuming that the countries are not already tar-
geted for patenting based on their market sizes). Additional coun-
try selections based on manufacturing alone will be technology-
specific (based on the varying manufacturing costs and locational 
advantages associated with different countries and types of tech-
nologies). These factors may also evolve significantly over time 
(based on changes in factors such as shifting labor costs and in-
creasing uses of robotic processes altering manufacturing costs in 
different countries over time). Unfortunately, countries with favor-
able manufacturing sites for a given type of patented product will 
need to be identified and targeted for patenting based on estimation 
of manufacturing features over the entire term of the patents at 
stake (a period of 20 years from patent application in the United 
States93). Information uncertainties governing these costs suggest 
that gaining patent protection in all likely manufacturing countries 
may be either expensive (because a broadly inclusive approach to 
manufacturing likelihood and associated patenting is pursued) or 
under-inclusive (because estimates focusing on patenting in pre-
sent manufacturing centers will not include other countries that 
become important later). Nonetheless, it will typically be important 
to consider adjusting initially chosen lists of countries for patent 
protection to add countries with any large manufacturing sites 
(both present and projected) that are not already included due to 
market size considerations. 
4. Protect Like an Affluent, Efficient Producer and Marketer 
As a last overarching consideration, a new technology produc-
er—particularly a party in a developing country who may be re-
source-constrained—should seek patent protections for a new ad-
vance that covers as much as possible of the full commercial value 
of the new advance, as this full value will be perceived and real-
ized by more affluent and efficient product producers and market-
ers. The value of patents always lies in the future completion of 
commercial processes influenced by the patents. To envision the 
 
93 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). 
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full value of patents, and to both produce the most valuable inven-
tions and obtain the best patents on them, innovators should project 
the future use of their innovations as protected by patents held by 
commercial entities that can make the best use of the patents. In-
novators, however small in resources and wherever located, should 
project the desirability of patents as if they were affluent commer-
cial parties with substantial expertise and resources sufficient to 
realize patent-influenced profits in United States markets and other 
profitable foreign markets. 
These projections are not mere fantasies; rather, in most cases 
of fully realized inventions with broad public utility and large 
commercial value, relatively simple legal measures can entice effi-
cient producers and marketers to carry out the full commercializa-
tion of valuable patented products. The innovators who have gen-
erated the products, and who have the appropriate patents to ensure 
that only they can transfer rights to produce and sell the products, 
will be in position to gain compensation for their patent rights that 
reflect the commercial value seen and realizable by efficient prod-
uct producers and marketers. 
This means that patent targeting decisions should be made as 
much as possible without limitations due to a technology produc-
er’s present resource constraints regarding the production and mar-
keting of products incorporating a patented advance. A technology 
producer should “think big” in assessing the commercial potential 
of a new advance, at least in assessing where commercial potential 
may lie in the future and where patent protections should be 
sought. The key in setting the proper perspective is that the tech-
nology originator will often not be the technology commercializer. 
The latter may have much greater resources than the technology 
originator (or may, in fact, be multiple parties who have much 
greater resources and market expertise in the aggregate). 
The perspective of a resource rich commercializer may be 
much more international than that of a small-scale technology orig-
inator seeking to just produce a viable product for marketing in just 
the originator’s own country. The total international value of a new 
technology properly protected with appropriate patents and other 
IP protections can be realized by combinations of licensees and 
assignees rather than by just the original technology producer. 
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However, if a technology originator only seeks limited patent 
protections (and major international markets are left out of the 
countries targeted for patenting), there will be little or no IP rights 
in key countries to transfer in license or assignment transactions. 
Parties will have little reason to devote the types of new product 
manufacturing and introduction resources that may be needed to 
popularize a new advance in major markets. For example, even if 
patent protections are obtained in one important market—say in 
the United States—the worldwide value of an invention may be 
sacrificed. The commercial value of the invention in other key 
markets such as Europe and Japan will be lost to the innovator by 
failing to seek patents there since the patented product can be made 
and sold freely in these areas by any party in the absence of patent 
protections. 
A technology originator determining where to patent a new in-
vention should evaluate the full range of potential invention re-
wards available through patent protections from the perspective of 
a well-healed large company that is operative in the same field and 
that can efficiently and effectively produce and market goods to 
meet the full worldwide demand for the patented advance. This 
sort of company will be the logical target for licensing or transfer 
of the resulting patents. The perspective of such a resource-rich 
party will determine the potential international value of the patent 
protections on a new advance because this perspective will deter-
mine the value of licenses or assignments of the patents at stake. 
This full value can be realized by an inventor, provided that the 
appropriate set of multi-country patent protections needed to sup-
port international commercialization is obtained and then offered 
to one or more companies capable of carrying out the commercial-
ization. 
Given a patent-defined opportunity to gain exclusive commer-
cial rights in major markets, a large company (as a potential licen-
see or assignee) is most likely to offer the innovator his or her best 
possible compensation for patent rights governing a new technolo-
gy. Absent some or all of the optimal patents (with optimality seen 
from the perspective of the large company), the large company’s 
offer will be reduced by the value of the missing patents. Hence, 
while a technology originator may be resource constrained and un-
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able to develop the full international commercial value of a new 
technology in all of the markets where the technology has signifi-
cant projected worth, the originator should make patent targeting 
decisions as if the resources for broad scale commercialization are 
present. If proper patent protections are sought, these resources 
will be brought to the commercialization process by other parties 
licensing or receiving assignments of the relevant patents. The full 
worldwide value of the technology originator’s new advance can 
be realized in this way, provided the originator has targeted and 
obtained the patents needed in the full range of major commercial 
markets. 
Finally, at the outset of projects, parties developing new tech-
nologies should emphasize the full range of commercial rewards 
for the products (as protected by appropriate patents) when seeking 
research funding and other support. This approach uses projected 
patenting and commercialization across multiple countries as key 
features of estimating the value of commercially-oriented research 
projects. The same approach will be useful in estimating the value 
of commercial components of projects with major commercial im-
plications even if further abstract knowledge is also targeted (as 
will be true in academic projects with commercial significance). 
The largest future value of many technical advances will be in the 
United States and in other countries with large economies. Re-
searchers will be able to present the best possible picture of the 
commercial potential for specific projects in two ways: first, by 
emphasizing that they are targeting the widespread needs of parties 
in those countries and second, by protecting the commercial value 
of new advances through corresponding patenting. They will there-
fore be likely to gain the largest investments and other support for 
additional resource-intensive innovation. 
B. Beneficiaries of International Influence from United States 
Patents 
Even without relying on patent-mediated research rewards 
from additional countries, foreign innovators stand to benefit from 
greater attention to patents in the United States for the reasons de-
scribed in this article. Inventors in some countries—particularly in 
Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—are already attuned to the 
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advantages of targeting patent-enhanced profits in the United 
States to increase research support and associated business profits. 
Innovators elsewhere will be well-served to follow their example 
and file for many more United States patents regarding their re-
search results. 
Expanded reliance on United States patents by innovators and 
research organizations worldwide will not only assist foreign re-
search projects but will benefit innovation developers and consum-
ers in all countries. Patent-induced investment in research, regard-
less of where the research is conducted, is likely to produce more 
research projects and more results. It will achieve this both by 
bringing more R&D research dollars into play and by shifting 
some existing funding from mundane, predictable lines of research 
to support instead the more innovative, non-obvious research likely 
to produce outlier advances that will qualify for patents. 
The new outlier inventions added to technology knowledge in 
this manner are benefits that simply would not be gained without 
the heightened and redirected research financing and efforts en-
couraged by patents. Technology developers everywhere stand to 
benefit greatly from these incremental efforts.  They will gain new 
knowledge about outlier advances as an enhanced base for further 
rounds of innovation. They can use this expanded knowledge to 
produce additional advances, often along fresh lines of design in-
spired and made possible by the root outlier advances enabled 
through patent subsidies. 
Perhaps more importantly, technology users worldwide will 
benefit from more numerous patent-induced research projects be-
cause these projects will be likely to produce more useful devices, 
materials, and processes. Patent incentives will encourage new de-
sign approaches to solve both old and new problems, resulting in 
advances with design elements that reflect significant departures 
from earlier technological tools. While not all patent-induced pro-
jects will succeed—just as not all batters get a hit at every at bat—
patent influence will encourage innovators to “think big” and try to 
depart from prevailing technology wisdom to produce more outlier 
advances that can qualify for patents. By increasing the numbers of 
advances produced and shifting projects towards greater emphasis 
on outlier approaches, United States patent incentives can create 
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innovation forces around the world that promote new originality in 
technology development and new lines of valuable technology 
tools. 
